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J.D., UCLA School of Law & LL.M., KU Leuven Faculty of Law; As a
Fulbright Scholar, the author studied law and policy. He then worked for
plaintiffs’ counsel on the high profile Toyota unintended acceleration multidistrict litigation. The author would like to thank Todd Walburg, Robert Nelson,
Jules Stuyck, Geert van Calster and William Rubenstein for their dedication to
consumer protection. Views expressed in this article are those of the author
and the author alone.
1
Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 731 (1992).
2
A Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1444 (2010) (insurance companies were cited
as another actor arguably making product liability lawsuits unnecessary).
3
In Re: Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales
Practices,
and
Products
Liability
Litigation,
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he number of product liability lawsuits increased dramatically during the late 1960s and 1970s. These lawsuits grabbed
the country’s attention as they motivated important safety improvements in various industries including automobile manufacturing. These lawsuits also penalized culpable manufacturers and
compensated consumers who suffered losses. During the 1980s
and 1990s, however, the success rate of these lawsuits decreased
sizably which led some to question their relevance in modern litigation. 1 In the past few years, some well-known scholars have
even argued that in light of the growing influence of other actors,
such as regulators, product liability lawsuits may be unnecessary. 2
In July of 2013, however, a $1.6 billion settlement was finalized between plaintiffs and Toyota Motor Corporation in the
Toyota Multidistrict Litigation (“Toyota MDL”). 3 This historic
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settlement, which is the largest automotive defect settlement in
United States history, has once again raised the public’s attention
of the field of product liability. The lawsuit demonstrated the inability of the primary regulatory agency, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), to independently motivate the adoption of state-of-the-art safety technology or adequately penalize manufacturers with fines limited in both scope
and amount. The lawsuit also showed a shift in the legal strategy
used by plaintiffs’ counsel in arguing automotive defect lawsuits
and how this shift is more likely to efficiently compensate plaintiffs than other approaches.
This article provides a comprehensive overview of important developments in automotive defect litigation. The article
begins by providing an overview of the field of automobile law,
explaining the role of NHTSA and key cases. Next, the article
provides a detailed background on the Toyota MDL, discussing
the congressional investigations and initial Toyota Motor Corp.
recalls. Then, the article describes the development of the Toyota
MDL in the Central District of California, in particular the structure of plaintiffs’ lawsuits. Finally, before concluding, the article
explains the impact of litigation as it relates to the adoption of automotive safety features, penalizing manufacturers, compensating
consumers for pure economic loss and curbing false or otherwise
misleading advertisements.

I. AUTOMOBILE REGULATIONS AND LAWSUITS

Driving an automobile is inherently dangerous and is typically the most dangerous activity in a person’s daily routine. The
statistics are scary. Every year, automobile accidents result in
tens of thousands of deaths. 4 In addition to emotional losses
which cannot be quantified, these accidents cost society hundreds
of billions of dollars in terms of worker productivity, medical
costs, insurance costs and other expenses. 5 For this reason, while
the extent of the issue has not always been fully recognized, automobile safety has always been an issue since the introduction of
the technology.

C M
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http://www.toyotaelsettlement.com/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
4
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
DEFECTS AND RECALLS 1 (2011) [hereinafter DEFECTS AND RECALLS].
5
Id.
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 384-85 (1916).
Id. at 389.
8
These companies mass produced vehicles becoming known colloquially
as the Big Three.
9
RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED, v-vi (1966) (comparing the automobile and aviation industries).
10
Id. at v-viii.
11
Id. at 140-58.
12
Id.
7
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Automobile lawsuits date as far back as the early 20th century when automobiles were first placed on the market. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., the court ruled in favor of a plaintiff
when the wooden spokes of a 1920 Buick Runabout’s wheel
crumbled, causing the car to collapse and eject the plaintiff. 6
Judge Benjamin Cardozo explained in his ruling that, “If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.
Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to
the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing
will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of
this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.” 7
Following World War II, the automobile became a cultural icon and driving to work became routine. Business boomed for
the major United States automobile manufacturers; General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. 8 While risks associated with driving
were of course known, public attention was not focused on them.
Moreover, while technology rapidly developed at this time, little
effort was focused on incorporating safety technology into automobiles. 9
In the mid-1960s, a period marked by challenging accepted cultural norms, members of the public began to challenge the
widespread use of the automobile with what were believed to be
its inherent risks. Consumer advocates alerted the public to manufacturers’ lack of interest in incorporating safety features. One
such consumer advocate, Ralph Nader, published his book “Unsafe at Any Speed” in 1965. In the book, Nader highlighted how
automobile accidents led to a huge loss of life, serious and long
lasting disabilities, and increased societal costs such as medical
treatment. 10 He further portrayed manufacturers as applying cost
benefit ratios in making design decisions affecting occupant safety. 11 He detailed the reluctance of vehicle manufacturers to install
available safety features during the 1950s and 1960s because of
the general unwillingness to accept additional costs. 12 Nader ex-
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plained that the gap between existing design and attainable safety had widened enormously. 13
During this same time, scientists also came forward with
data precisely demonstrating the grave risks associated with driving. In 1966, the National Academy of Sciences published “Accidental Death and Disability – The Neglected Disease of Modern
Society,” treated automobile accidents as an epidemic, and provided further scientific data supporting the risks associated with
driving. 14 The report explained that in 1965, automobile accidents
and other accidental injuries killed 107,000 people, temporarily
disabled over 10 million, and permanently impaired 400,000
American citizens at a cost of approximately $18 billion.15 According to the report, “[t]his neglected epidemic of modern society
[was] the nation’s most important environmental health problem.” 16
With public opinion now focused on the issue of automobile safety, the automobile manufacturers responded by asserting
that driver error was largely responsible for deaths and injuries.17
Moreover, while certain safety features could be implemented,
manufacturers asserted that consumers did not necessarily desire
such features. 18 Despite pushback from manufacturers, in 1966,
under increasing pressure to address the issue of automobile safety, the United States Congress held a series of high profile hearings on highway safety. Congress later that year passed the
Highway Safety Act, providing federal guidance and funding to
states for the creation of highway safety programs. 19 Also in 1966,
Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety

06/02/2014 15:10:17
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13
Id.; Even as the technology to save lives became available, it was not
being implemented. For instance, it was argued that mandating the installation of seat belts on all vehicles would save thousands of lives by reducing the
severity of a “second collision” between the occupant and the interior of the
vehicle or from being ejected through the vehicle’s windshield. See WENDY
WATERS, ET. AL., A HALF CENTURY OF ATTEMPTS TO RE-SOLVE VEHICLE
OCCUPANT SAFETY: UNDERSTANDING SEATBELT AND AIRBAG TECHNOLOGY
1337-38 (1998). However, while in the early 1960s seatbelts were generally
available as an option on American vehicles, less than ten percent of vehicles
had them. By mid-1960 the number had increased, but still only about thirty
percent of vehicles on the road had them by 1966. Id. at 1338.
14
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND
DISABILITY – THE NEGLECTED DISEASE OF MODERN SOCIETY, 5 (1966).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
NADER, supra note 9, at 176.
18
Id. at 140.
19
23 U.S.C.A. § 402 (West 2014).
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Act in response to the “soaring rate of death and debilitation on
the Nation’s highways.” 20 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act’s purpose has been to reduce traffic accidents,
deaths, and injuries resulting from traffic accidents. 21
B. The National Highway Safety Administration
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act created the predecessor to the Department of Transportation’s
NHTSA which is overseen by the Secretary of Transportation.
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, now recodified as 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301, provides that NHTSA shall conduct necessary safety research 22 and prescribe motor vehicle and
equipment safety standards. 23
Section 49 U.S.C. 30111 articulates NHTSA’s ability to
prescribe safety standards. 24 Each standard shall be “practicable,
meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective
terms.” When prescribing a motor vehicle and equipment safety
standard, NHTSA must: (1) consider relevant available motor
vehicle and equipment safety information; (2) consult with other
appropriate State or interstate authorities; (3) consider whether a
proposed standard is reasonable, practicable, and appropriate for
the particular type of motor vehicle or equipment; and (4) consider to what extent the standard will carry out the purpose of the
20

S. REP. No. 89-1301, at 1 (1966).
49 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (West 2014).
22
To evaluate these and related activities, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act
requires that an annual report be delivered to the President to submit to Congress. First, the report shall include a thorough statistical compilation of accidents and injuries. Second, the report shall include current motor vehicles safety standards in effect and the degree of observance of these standards. Third,
the report shall include a summary of current research grants and contracts
and a description of the problems to be considered under the grants and contract. Fourth, the reports shall include an analysis and evaluation of research
activities completed and technological progress achieved. Fifth, the report
shall include information on undertaken enforcement actions. Sixth, the report
shall include the extent to which technical information was given to the scientific community and consumer-oriented information was made available to the
public. Finally, the report shall include recommendations for legislation needed to promote cooperation among the States in improving traffic safety and
strengthening the national traffic safety program. The Department of Transportation has provided NHTSA, one of its agencies, with these responsibilities.
49 U.S.C.A. § 30169 (West 2014).
23
49 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (West 2014).
24
The section empowers the Department of Transportation with these responsibilities which have been assigned to NHTSA.
21
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49 U.S.C.A. § 30111 (West 2014).
49 U.S.C.A. § 30162 (West 2014).
27
49 U.S.C.A. § 30162 (West 2014).
28
49 U.S.C.A. § 30162 (West 2014).
29
49 U.S.C.A. § 30166 (West 2014).
30
49 U.S.C.A. § 30162 (West 2014).
31
49 U.S.C.A. § 30162 (West 2014).
32
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THIS IS NHTSA 1 (2006)
[hereinafter NHTSA].
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
49 U.S.C.A. § 30112 (West 2014).
26
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National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 25
NHTSA can independently move to require a particular
safety standard. Any interested person may also file a petition
with NHTSA requesting that NHTSA begin a proceeding to prescribe a specific safety standard. 26 The petition must state facts
establishing that a safety standard is necessary. 27 Upon receipt of
the petition, NHTSA may hold a public hearing or conduct an
investigation or proceeding to determine whether to grant the petition. 28 When conducting an investigation, NHTSA may inspect
records of a manufacturer, distributor or dealer and even temporarily impound a vehicle involved in an accident. 29 If based on
the findings of any public hearing or any investigation, a petition
is denied, NHTSA shall publish the reasons for the denial in the
Federal Register. 30 If, however, the petition is granted, NHTSA
will promptly initiate proceedings to prescribe the specific safety
standards that have been evaluated. 31
The adoption of a safety standard is a multistage process.
First, NHTSA investigates the problem and possible countermeasures. 32 Second, NHTSA issues a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register to garner feedback on the proposal from manufacturers, trade associations, insurers, consumer
groups and private individuals. 33 Finally, after public review and
comment, NHTSA may issue a final rule adopting or modifying
the proposed standard. 34
All new automobile vehicles or equipment sold in the
United States must meet Federal motor vehicle safety standards.
Companies are prohibited from manufacturing, selling and importing automobile vehicles and equipment manufactured on or
after the date of an applicable safety standard.35 Any safety
standard set by NHTSA is only a minimum safety standard as
motor vehicle safety standard means a “minimum standard for
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motor vehicle . . . performance.” 36 A manufacturer violation of
these minimum standards can be penalized with civil penalties.
Section 49 U.S.C. 30165 previously allowed for civil penalties of
up to approximately $16 million and currently allows for civil
penalties of up to $35 million for violations of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 37
C. Mandated Manufacturer Recalls

36
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49 U.S.C.A. § 30102 (West 2014).
Improvements in vehicle design quickly followed passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, including mandating seat belts,
shatter-resistant windshields and energy absorbing steering wheels. Safety Research for a Changing Highway Environment (Transportation Research
Board 1990). These safety improvements have saved tens of thousands of lives.
For instance, it has been estimated that making seatbelts mandatory on all vehicles has prevented tens of thousands of deaths annually. WATERS, supra note
13, at 1338.
38
NHTSA, supra note 32, at 3.
39
DEFECTS AND RECALLS, supra note 4, at 3.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 4-6.
42
Adopted in 2000, the TREAD Act, has allowed NHTSA to develop an
37
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The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act also
provides NHTSA with the authority to require manufacturers to
recall automobile vehicles and equipment when they do not meet
a Federal safety standard or there is another safety-related defect. 38 The United States Code for Motor Vehicle Safety (Title 49,
Chapter 301) defines a defect to include “any defect in performance, construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle
or motor vehicle equipment.” 39 NHTSA has further explained
that a safety defect is a problem that exists in a vehicle or item of
equipment that poses a risk to motor vehicle safety, and may exist
in a group of vehicles of the same design or manufacture, or items
of equipment of the same type and manufacture. 40
On its own NHTSA monitors automobile vehicles and
equipment to ensure that they meet applicable standards or are
not otherwise defective. Consumers and manufacturers also report potential safety defects to the agency. Every month consumers report several thousand potential safety problems through the
Department of Transportation’s Vehicle Safety Hotline and
NHTSA’s vehicle safety website. 41 Manufacturers are required to
report safety defects pursuant to the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act (“TREAD
Act”). 42
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NHTSA can open an investigation if the agency believes
that a safety defect exists. NHTSA can also be petitioned to undertake an investigation into an alleged safety defect. 43 If a petition is denied, NHTSA will publish reasons for the denial in the
Federal Register. If a petition is granted, NHTSA will open an
investigation.44 As with adopting a safety standard, an investigation is a multistage process. The process also can vary depending
on the willingness of manufacturers to initiate a recall from the
outset, during the investigation or only after significant pressure
from NHTSA. 45
First, a preliminary evaluation takes place for a particular
automobile vehicle or equipment defect. NHTSA will analyze information obtained from the vehicle’s manufacturer such as data
on complaints, crashes, injuries and warranty claims. 46 During
this preliminary evaluation, a manufacturer can also present its
views on the alleged defect and prevent any further NHTSA action by independently initiating a recall. 47 After this preliminary
evaluation, based on the agency’s findings, NHTSA will either
close the investigation or begin conducting a full engineering
analysis.48
Second, if NHTSA moves forward with a full engineering
analysis, the agency will gather from the manufacturer any necessary additional information about the alleged defect and will
conduct any necessary inspections, tests, and surveys. 49 After

06/02/2014 15:10:17
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Early Warning Reporting system. This Early Warning Reporting system requires vehicle manufacturers to notify NHTSA of fatalities, injuries, property
damage claims, consumer complaints and safety campaigns that have to the
manufacturer’s attention. Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act of 2000, 49 U.S.C.A §§ 30101-30183 (West 2014).
The Act requires manufacturers to report “all incidents of which the manufacturers receives actual notice which involve fatalities or serious injuries which
are alleged or proven to have been caused by possible defect” to the Secretary
of Transportation who supervisors Department of Transportation’s agencies,
including NHTSA. 49 U.S.C.A. § 30166 (West 2014). Civil penalties are imposed of up to thirty-five million dollars for failing to provide the Secretary of
Transportation with such information. 49 U.S.C.A. § 30165(a) (West 2014).
Further, the Act imposes criminal liability for failing to provide the information. 49 U.S.C.A. § 30170 (West 2014).
43
DEFECTS AND RECALLS, supra note 4, at 8.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 8-9.
46
NHTSA, supra note 32, at 2.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
DEFECTS AND RECALLS, supra note 4, at 9.
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Id.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
NHTSA, supra note 32, at 2.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
DEFECTS AND RECALLS, supra note 4, at 10.
59
NHTSA, supra note 32, at 3.
60
Id.
61
Id. (Manufactures can challenge the recall order in a Federal District
Court).
51
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gathering additional information and conducting inspections,
tests, or surveys, if NHTSA does not discover a safety-related defect, it will close the investigation without further action. 50 If the
manufacturer independently initiates a recall, the investigation
will also be closed. 51 However, if at the conclusion of the full engineering analysis, NHTSA believes that a safety defect exists,
the agency will internally brief a panel of experts on the discovered defect. 52 If the panel agrees that a safety defect exists and the
manufacturer does not provide any analysis or data contradicting
this finding,53 NHTSA will send a “Recall Request Letter” asking
the automobile vehicle or equipment manufacturer to fix the defect by conducting a recall. 54
Third, if upon receiving a Recall Request Letter, an automobile vehicle or equipment manufacturer refuses to voluntarily
initiate a recall, NHTSA will take steps to demonstrate that a recall is necessary and require such by law.55 The agency may issue
an initial decision that a safety defect exists. 56 Material from investigations into the defect will be provided to the automobile
vehicle or equipment manufacturer and made available to the
public in NHTSA’s reading room. 57 NHTSA will then host a
public meeting where all interested parties may present their
views, including the manufacturer of the automobile vehicle or
equipment being examined, other manufacturers, trade associations, public interest groups, and consumers. 58 A record of the investigation, including information submitted at the public hearing, is presented to the NHTSA Administrator. 59 Based on this
information, the Administrator will decide whether to issue a final decision that safety defect exist and order a recall. 60 If, after
the Administrator’s decision, a manufacturer refuses to in initiate
a recall, NHTSA can go to court to compel the manufacturer to
comply with the decision. 61
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When a recall takes place, NHTSA will supervise it to ensure that it is conducted properly. An automobile vehicle or
equipment manufacturer is required to remedy safety defects by
repairing, replacing or repurchasing vehicles, at no charge to
owners. 62 An automobile vehicle or equipment manufacturer initially decides on the remedy for the safety defect. 63 If the manufacturer’s remedy is not effective, however, NHTSA may require
the manufacturer to adopt a new one. NHTSA maintains records
for all safety recalls and makes sure that the completion rate is
adequate. 64
D. Litigation Trends
Following the adoption of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, there has been a significant increase in the
number of automotive defect lawsuits. Product liability lawsuits,
62

Id.
Id.
64
Id. NHTSA recall requirements apply to vehicles and equipment up to
10 years old and to tires up to 5 years old. Further information on recalls and
other safety issues can be found through NHTSA’s safety website portal at
www.safercar.gov. Since the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, hundreds of millions of vehicles have been recalled to correct safety defects.
DEFECTS AND RECALLS, supra note 4, at 1. The largest recalls in U.S. history
have been for a range of failures for vehicle models produced by a number of
manufacturers. The five largest recalls were 21 million Ford 1970-1980 model
year vehicles being recalled for transmission that failed to engage park; 15 million Ford 1992-2003 model year vehicles being recalled for faulty cruise control
systems; 7.9 million Ford 1988-1993 model year vehicles being recalled over
ignition switch fires; 6.9 million Chevrolet 1965-1970 model year vehicles being recalled as a result of broken motor mounts; and, 5.8 million General Motors 1978-1981 model year vehicles for lower arm bold failures leading to suspension collapse. Top 10 Largest Car Recalls in American History, CONSUMER
REPORTS
NEWS
(Oct.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2012/10/top-10-largest-car-recallsin-american-history/index.htm; The sixth largest was for unintended acceleration risks associated with floor mats in certain Toyota Motor Corp.’s Toyota
model vehicles. However, if the number of recalls for floor mats is combined
with the number of recalls for accelerator pedals, then together they are one of
the five largest recalls. James R. Healey, Toyota Expands Floor Matt Recall;
Supplier
Redesigns
Pedal,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
28,
2010),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/autos/2010-01-26-toyota_N.htm; Other
major recalls involved millions of Hondas and Volkswagens being recalled for
faulty seat belt buckles and windshield wipers, respectively. Top 10 Largest
Car Recalls in American History, CONSUMER REPORTS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2012/10/top-10-largest-car-recallsin-american-history/index.htm.
63
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including automotive defect lawsuits, are a mix of causes of action that are typically associated with tort and contract law. As
explained by one leading scholar, “the foundation of products liability works on both contract and tort axes” where “claims for redress from product injuries may be phrased in contract or tort
language.” 65 Along these lines, such lawsuits involve traditional
tort law causes of action, including negligence and strict liability, 66 and causes of action typically associated with contract law,
including breach of warranty. 67 Product liability lawsuits can also
involve various consumer protection claims that are statutorily
defined. 68
Changes in the field of law that made it easier for plaintiffs to succeed using tort causes of action have been attributed
with the increase of product liability lawsuits during the late
1960s and 1970s. 69 During this time, courts conferred on judges
and jurors broad discretion to impose new responsibilities on
companies 70 and limited the availability of defenses based on a
plaintiff’s misuse of a product and assumption of risk. 71 Plaintiffs
65

06/02/2014 15:10:17
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Roy Kreitner, Fault at the Contract-Tort Interface, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1533, 1543-44 (2009).
66
A manufacturer is liable for harm caused by their defective product if a
plaintiff can show negligence by the manufacturer failing to exercise reasonable care in the manufacturing of a product, thus creating an unreasonable risk
of harm to those using it in a reasonably foreseeable manner. Gunther Kuhne,
Choice of Law in Products Liability, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1972) available at
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol60/iss1/1. A plaintiff will succeed under a strict liability cause of action in certain jurisdictions
by simply showing that he or she suffered injury due to the normal use of a
product that was defective without showing any negligence on the part of the
manufacturer. Id. at 3-4.
67
A plaintiff will succeed in a breach of warranty cause of action when
the manufacturer has advertised specific qualities of his or her product that
were in fact not present. Id. at 3. Separate causes of action exist for both express and implied breach of warranty. Id.
68
A plaintiff will succeed under various consumer protection claims if
they meet the statutory requirements for the specific claim. See generally
Kuhne, supra note 66, at 2-4.
69
W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily Injury 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 321
(1986). At this time the economic incentives for safety also became a major influence on corporations and many companies established corporate product
safety offices to into the design and manufacturing of safer products. Id.
70
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1919, 1919 (2010).
71
Viscusi, supra note 69, at 321.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 74 Side A

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Ezroj Article3.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014

5/21/2014 2:36 PM

Product Liability After Unintended Acceleration

481

succeeded on tort causes of action in the face of manufacturers
arguing that either no regulatory requirement existed which
could make them liable or compliance with a separate regulatory
requirement protected them. Tort law has also allowed for the recovery of large punitive damages.
In the 1980s, however, there was much criticism of the increase in product liability lawsuits. 72 Courts became less receptive
to tort law causes of action asserting that certain losses, such a
pure economic loss, could only be redressed under contract causes
of action where there was privity of contract. 73 With changes in
the legal field related to traditional tort causes of action and shifting judicial attitudes, some scholars have argued that in the 1980s
there began a “Quiet Revolution in Products Liability.” 74 This
quiet revolution involved a declining success rate among plaintiffs starting in the mid-1980s corresponding to the changing judicial attitudes. 75
As a result of these changes in attitude toward tort law
and the general declining success rate of plaintiffs in product liability lawsuits, plaintiffs in automotive defect litigation and other
product liability lawsuits must increasingly rely on causes of action typically associated with contract law or defined under a
consumer protection statute. While these causes of action may be
limited to situations where there is privity of contract or require
elements not otherwise required under traditional tort law, they
also present the possibility for recovery for pure economic loss
where such recovery may otherwise not be available.
1. Absence of a Regulation

72

Kreitner, supra note 65, at 1545.
Id. at 1545-56.
74
Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 1, at 733-34.
75
Id.; Some courts have specifically stated that certain actions were best
addressed through contract causes of action, where a contractual relationship
existed, rather than a tort law cause of action.
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Early automotive defect litigation survived arguments
made regarding the absence of regulations clearly establishing liability. Automobile manufacturers have repeatedly argued that
they could not be held liable for injuries due to a vehicle’s design
where no laws specifically required safer vehicle construction.
This argument was unsuccessful prior to the adoption of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, when there was no
regulatory framework in place for the automobile industry. The

73
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81

Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (1968).
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
Larsen, 391 F.2d at 496-97.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 503.
Id.
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argument has also been unsuccessful even after the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act’s implementation that put
such a framework in place. Manufacturers were unsuccessful in
making such an argument in both Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp. 76
and Dawson v. Chrysler Corp. 77 As a result of these cases, it became clear that a manufacturer could not escape liability simply
by abiding by the safety standards imposed by NHTSA.
In Larsen, a driver was injured when his head struck the
steering wheel of his Chevy Corvair during a head-on collision. 78
The plaintiff alleged that the negligent design of the steering assembly contributed to the injury even though the alleged defect
did not cause the accident. 79 The plaintiff’s complaint alleged: (1)
negligence in design of the steering assembly; (2) negligent failure
to warn of the alleged latent or inherently dangerous condition to
the user of the steering assembly placement; and (3) breach of express and implied warranties of merchantability of the vehicle’s
intended use.80 General Motors argued that the law imposed no
duty of care in the design of an automobile to make it safer to occupy in the event of a collision. 81 Moreover, according to General
Motors, because the manufacturer did not have a duty of care
there could be no actionable negligence on the manufacturer’s
part to either design a safer vehicle or to warn of any inherent or
latent defects that might make its vehicles less safe than those
sold by other manufacturers. 82
The court explained that since Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co. courts have held that automobile manufacturers are under
a duty to construct a vehicle that is free of latent and hidden defect. 83 The court then explained that while design defect not causing an accident would not subject a manufacturer to liability for
the entire accident, the manufacturer should be liable for that
portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design
over and above the damage or injury that probably would have
occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective
design. 84 Moreover, while General Motors argued that any safety
standards in design should be imposed by the National Traffic
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and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the court explained that Section
108(c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c), expressly negated any intention of Congress to acquire exclusive jurisdiction in this field and
to instead left common liability in place. 85
In Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., a police officer driving a
Dodge Manaco was paralyzed when he struck a pole in pursuit of
a possible burglar. 86 The plaintiffs’ claims were based on theories
of strict product liability and breach of implied warranty of fitness. 87 Chrysler argued that it had no duty to produce a “crashproof” vehicle and emphasized that the design of the vehicle
complied with all of the standards authorized by Congress in the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and set forth in
accompanying regulations. 88 As in Larsen, the court explained
that compliance with safety standards promulgated pursuant to
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not relieve
Chrysler of liability. 89 The court similarly cited to 15 U.S.C. §
1397(c), explaining that in authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to enact safety standards, Congress explicitly provided that
“[c]ompliance with the Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any
liability under common law.” 90
2. Preemption

85
86
87

89
90
91
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88

Id. at 506.
Dawson, 630 F.2d at 953-54.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Ellen L. Theroff, Preemption of Airbag Litigation: Just a Lot of Hot
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Automotive defect litigation has also generally survived
arguments made regarding preemption. Similar to arguments
made regarding the absence of regulation, manufacturers have
argued, with mixed success, that they cannot be held liable when
they comply with a law requiring a specific safety or selection of
safety features. A notable example of where this argument arose
is with the installation of airbags. In the 1980s, dozens of lawsuits
alleged that vehicle manufacturers knew that the absence of airbags resulted in thousands of unnecessary deaths annually. Manufacturers defended such lawsuits by arguing that federal law
preempted these common law lawsuits, seeking to defeat the lawsuits on motions for summary judgment before the plaintiff had a
chance to litigate his or her case on its merits. 91

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 75 Side B

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Ezroj Article3.docx (Do Not Delete)

484

Loyola Consumer Law Review

5/21/2014 2:36 PM

Vol. 26:3

C M
Y K

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Air?, 76 VA. L. REV. 577, 577-79 (1990).
92
Id. at 584-85 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1989)).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 577-78.
95
Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 401-02 (1st Cir. 1987).
96
Wood, 865 F.2d at, 402.
97
Id. at 414.
98
For examples of cases in which the plaintiff was not preempted by federal law, see Theroff, supra note 91, at 589-90 & n.59 (citing Richart v. Ford
Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462 (D.N.M. 1988), Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684
F.Supp. 407 (D.Md. 1987), Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 673 F.Supp. 1108
(D.Mass. 1987), and Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 650 F.Supp. 922
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At the time, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act had a specific framework for crash protection standards.
NHTSA’s Safety Standard 208, adopted as 49 C.F.R. §
571.208.S4.1.2.1, provided manufacturers with three compliance
options. 92 These options included: (1) installing a passive restraint
system, such as airbags, in conjunction with seatbelts; (2) installing a combination of passive restraints, detachable shoulder
harnesses, lap belts and warning systems; or (3) installing a combination of lap belts, non-detachable shoulder harnesses, and
warning systems. 93 In motions for summary judgment, manufacturers argued that so long as they complied with one of these options they were protected from tort liability as to any related
claim. 94
Manufacturers were successful in the majority of the lawsuits. For instance, in Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., the court recognized the savings clause articulated in 15 U.S.C. 1397(c) and
said that Congress intended that federal safety standards would
not interfere with ongoing litigation as they understood it. 95 However, after evaluating the legislative history for the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the court determined that Congress did not foresee the possibility of litigation that would, in
practical effect, impose new and conflicting state safety standards
on national automobile manufacturers. 96 The court then concluded that the airbag claim, being in direct conflict with federal safety standards, was impliedly preempted by the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and specifically stated that Section
15 U.S.C. 1397(c) did not evidence a contrary congressional intention. 97
Other courts, however, sided with plaintiffs. These courts
agreed that airbag litigation was not entirely preempted allowing
common law tort lawsuits to survive summary judgment and
proceed. 98 In these cases the courts tended to rely on a United
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States Supreme Court decision unrelated to automotive liability,
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., where the Supreme Court explained that notwithstanding the federal government’s strong
presence in a particular field, a jury award of punitive damages
did not constitute a form of state regulation and was thus not
preempted by federal laws prohibiting state regulation in that area. 99 These courts also tended to agree with plaintiffs, who typically relied on Section 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c), that the most reasonable way to reconcile the purpose behind and language of the
National Motor Vehicle Traffic Safety Act was that it does not
preempt plaintiffs’ common law claims. 100
3. Punitive Damages
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(E.D.N.Y. 1987)).
99
Id. at 591.
100
See, e.g., Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407 (D.Md. 1987).
101
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 774 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981).
102
Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 774.
103
Id. at 774-75.
104
Id. at 776.
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The availability of punitive damages has been a major
advantage to automotive defect litigation incorporating tort law
causes of action. Punitive damages are generally reserved for instances where a defendant has intended to cause harm which can
arise in automotive defect litigation. In particular, manufacturers
have incurred large punitive damages where they have made cost
benefit calculations when deciding whether to implement safety
features. One of the most famous examples is a lawsuit involving
the Ford Pinto. In the late 1960s, Ford began designing a new
compact vehicle that eventually became its Pinto model. In designing the Pinto, Ford’s objective was to construct an economy
vehicle that could be sold at a cost of no more than $2,000. 101
During the Pinto’s development, prototypes were built and tested. 102 These tests revealed that the gas tank, which was behind
the rear axle, would puncture during crash tests at speeds of as
little as 21 miles per hour. 103 Additional safety features costing
less than $20, such as equipping the car with a reinforced rear
structure, an improved bumper and additional crush space,
would have made the fuel tank safe at speeds of up to 34-38 miles
per hour.104 Further safety efforts, such as relocating the tank
over the rear axle, would have made the Pinto safe in rear impact
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at 50 miles per hour or more. 105 However, Ford opted not to install these features.
In 1981, a former Ford engineer and executive in charge of
the company’s crash testing program testified in Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co.106 He stated that the highest level of Ford’s management decided to continue with the Pinto’s production despite
knowing that the gas tank was vulnerable to puncture at low rear
impact speeds which created a significant risk of death and injury. 107 Moreover, the Ford engineer testified that the highest level
of Ford’s management knew that safety features existed which
would solve or otherwise ameliorate this vulnerability and these
features were feasible at a nominal cost. 108 The Ford engineer explained that cost savings, from not making or delaying the incorporation of these features, motivated the decision to move forward with production of the vehicle without incorporating these
safety features. 109 As a result of the Ford engineer’s testimony and
other evidence presented, the plaintiff was awarded $125 million
(later reduced) in punitive damages to victims of a 1972 Ford Pinto explosion where a victim’s vehicle erupted into flames on a
freeway after being rear-ended. 110
In 1999, a Los Angeles jury awarded $4.8 billion dollars
(later reduced) in punitive damages to passengers who suffered
severe burns in a 1979 Chevrolet Malibu. 111 The award, which
was then the largest punitive damage award ever in a personal
injury case, was due at least in part to General Motors specifically
analyzing the types of fire risks and costs associated with incor-
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Id.
Id. at 777.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 771-72; Compare NADER, supra note 9 (alleging that manufacturers have deliberately decided to forgo important safety features that would impose only minimal costs), with W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A
Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 550-51 (2000) (arguing that regardless of
the costs a jury will find such a calculation despicable). Professor W. Kip Viscusi stated, “But what are these ‘despicable acts?’ In some cases, the alleged
despicable act maybe the actual undertaking of a risk analysis itself rather
than a failure to strike an appropriate risk-cost balance in its product safety or
environmental risk choices.” Id. at 551. “One would expect jurors to be more
lenient if the company could justify its actions based on a benefit-cost analysis.” Empirical studies however show that this is not the case. The character of
the analysis that the company performs does not have a statistically significant
effect as to whether punitive damages would be awarded. See Id. at 556-57.
111
Viscusi, supra note 110, at 547.
106
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porating safety features and decided not to incorporate these safety features. 112
4. Pure Economic Loss
The area of pure economic loss, however, has presented
challenges for automotive defect litigation relying on tort law
causes of action. In the 1980s, beyond simply limiting recovery in
product liability lawsuits, courts in certain jurisdictions more
broadly limited recovery under tort law where there was only
pure economic loss. In tort law, injuries from defective product
can be divided into claims for personal injury, property damage
and economic loss. A personal injury occurs when a defective
product causes injury to a person. Property damage occurs when
a defective product causes injury to other property. Economic
loss occurs when a defective product causes damage to itself.
Economic loss is “the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general
purposes for which it was manufactured and sold.” 113 The majority rule in courts has become that recovery for economic loss under tort law is not allowed where there is no personal injury or
property damage. 114
Rules pertaining to economic loss have developed over the
past century. Early in the 20th century, the court in Ultramares
Corporation v. Touche articulated concerns regarding recovery
112
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Professor Viscusi has criticized juries for making such decisions explaining that such calculations have a societal benefit. According to Professor
Viscusi, certain activities such as driving an automobile are inherently risky.
Id. Professor Viscusi believes that manufacturers should not be faulted additionally for undertaking an erroneous analysis and that undertaking a risk
analysis before marketing a risky product should not be viewed as reckless
corporate behavior. Standard negligence principles call for risk balancing.
Firms therefore should be encouraged to make such judgments explicitly. Professor Viscusi explained though that these legal ideals are, however, divorced.
113
Cathy Bellehumeur, Recovery for Economic Loss Under a Products
Liability Theory: From the Beginning Through the Current Trend, 70 MARQ.
L.
REV.
320,
321
(1987)
available
at
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol70/iss2/. Economic loss is the
diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality and does
not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold. Id.
Economic loss, which includes the cost of repairs, cost of replacement and loss
of profits, consists of both direct loss and consequential loss. Direct economic
loss is the difference between the value of what is received and its value as represented. Consequential economic loss includes all indirect loss, such as the loss
in profits resulting from the purchaser’s inability to use the defective profit. Id.
114
Id. at 320.
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117
118
119
120
121

(1986).
123
124

E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 871.
Bellehumeur, supra note 113, at 320.
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122

Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
Id.
Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 145-46 (Cal. 1965).
Seely, 403 P.2d at 145-46.Id.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id.
E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871
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for pure economic loss. 115 Here the court described the risks associated with granting economic loss on its own as, “liability in an
indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time, to an indeterminate class.” 116 The court in Seely v. White Motor Co. articulated the economic loss rule. The plaintiff purchased a truck to use
in his business for heavy-duty hauling.117 The plaintiff’s vehicle,
however, bounced violently and the plaintiff discovered that the
brakes did not work. 118 Therefore, the plaintiff brought an action
against the dealership where the vehicle was purchased and the
manufacturer for: (1) damages, related to the accident, for the repair of the truck; and (2) damages, unrelated to the accident, for
the money he paid on the purchase price and for the profits lost in
his business because he was unable to make normal use of the
truck. 119 The court explained that “a consumer should not be
charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of
physical injury when he buys a product on the market. 120 He can,
however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not
match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees
that it will. Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer’s liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no
recovery for economic loss alone.” 121
In the 1980s, restrictions on plaintiffs’ ability to recover
for economic loss gained momentum. In 1985, in E. River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court succinctly stated the economic loss rule, after which it was
more broadly adopted throughout the country. 122 Here the Supreme Court said, “A manufacturer in a commercial relationship
has no duty under either negligence or strict products-liability
theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.” 123 Since this
time, more jurisdictions have abided by this reasoning and the
majority rule is that there should be no recovery under tort law
where there is only pure economic loss. 124
That being said, some courts have departed from the ma-
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In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp.
2d 1069, 1104 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 1105.
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Arnold Gene Rubin, Products Liability: Expanding the Property Damage Exception in Pure Economic Loss Cases, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
963, 970 (1978) (discussing the expansion of property exception in pure economic loss cases).
131
Kwikset Corp. v Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 316 (2011).
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jority to allow recovery of pure economic loss either as a form of
property damage or allowed recovery of economic loss on its own.
There is now a complicated framework where pure economic loss
is recoverable under tort law in certain jurisdictions, but not others. A ruling in one of the more famous automobile disputes, that
involved Ford Explorers equipped with Bridgestone/Firestone
(“Firestone”) tires, illustrated this framework. In In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability Litigation, defendants brought a motion to dismiss arguing that plaintiffs’ negligence claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine where
plaintiffs asserted injuries in the form of one or more damaged
tires after experiencing tread separation. 125 The court agreed with
defendants that negligence claims were barred under Tennessee
law, citing authority stating that, “Tennessee has joined those jurisdictions which hold that product liability claims resulting in
pure economic loss can be better resolved on theories other than
negligence.” 126 Then the court cited E. River S.S. Corp., explaining that damage to a defective product itself generally is treated
as economic loss not recoverable in tort, but rather “most naturally understood as a warranty claim.” 127 The court then dismissed
the action against Firestone which was headquartered in Tennessee. 128 The court, however, then explained that that in the alternative, Michigan allows negligence claims to be pursued for pure
economic loss and accordingly denied the motion to dismiss with
respect to negligence claims against Ford which was headquartered in Michigan. 129
With limitations placed on recovering for pure economic
loss under tort law, plaintiffs have increasingly argued for the recovery of such losses under alternative legal theories. 130 In Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, a plaintiff filed a complaint alleging
unfair competition and false advertising claims for a locket inaccurately labeled “Made in U.S.A.” 131 The plaintiff then amended
the complaint alleging that he purchased Kwikset’s lockets and
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would not have done so but for the “Made in U.S.A.” label. 132 The
defendant tried to argue that the plaintiff had insufficient standing to sue. 133 The California Supreme Court, however, dismissed
the argument that plaintiffs got the benefit of their bargain and
therefore no money or property had been lost in the original
transaction. 134 According to the Supreme Court, this reasoning
was flawed. 135 It falsely assumed that plaintiff could turn around
and sell the lockets to someone else for the same price, and that
there would be no transaction costs involved in such a sale. 136 At
the very least, sufficient standing to sue existed where plaintiff
purchased a product and had in its place a product they valued at
less than what they paid. 137 According to the Supreme Court,
locks that were falsely advertised as made in the United States
could be worthless to a consumer even if the locks were fully
functional. 138
E. Landmark Safety Improvements

132
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Kwikset Corp., 51 Cal. 4th at 316.
Id.
134
Id. at 332-34.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 335.
138
Id. at 317-25; “[P]laintiffs who can truthfully allege they were deceived
by a product’s label into spending money to purchase the product, and would
not have purchased it otherwise, have ‘lost money or property’ within the
meaning of Proposition 64 and have standing to sue.” Id. at 317.
133
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A number of important safety requirements were enacted
contemporaneously with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act. With the increased number of product liability lawsuits following the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act’s implementation, however, certain safety defects have been
heavily litigated. While it is not possible to state conclusively that
this litigation directly resulted in the implementation of safety
improvements to address these defects, often times important
safety improvements have been adopted following such litigation.
Along these lines, landmark safety improvements that have followed contested litigation include: (1) shielding gas tanks; (2)
strengthening automobile frames; (3) requiring the installation of
airbags; and (4) improving tire tread through more fastidious reporting requirements.
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1. Gas Tanks Located within Automobile Frames
Gas tanks originally had no location standards for their
placement. Therefore, for various reasons which typically had to
do with cost, some manufacturers installed gas tanks in areas of a
vehicle that made them vulnerable to a puncture in a rear-end or
side impact collision.139 However, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.
and other lawsuits, such as those against General Motors for a
“side saddle” gas tank, motivated the adoption of requirements
for fuel tank performance during collisions.140 Gas tanks are now
universally located within a vehicle’s rigid frames.
2. Strengthening Frames

139
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Grimshaw, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 757.
Id. For an example of another case that motivated the adoption of requirements for fuel tanks see Bloyed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422
(Tex. App. 1994).
141
Dyson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
142
Dyson, 298 F. Supp. at 1073.
143
49 C.F.R. § 571.216 (2014).
144
Court Upholds Verdict in Roof Crush Case, AUTOSAFETY.ORG,
http://www.autosafety.org/court-upholds-verdict-roof-crush-case-0 (last visited
140
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In addition to ensuring that vulnerable vehicle components, such as gas tanks, are sheltered within the frame of a vehicle, product liability litigation has resulted in the more sturdy design of frames altogether. Strengthened standards for roof
strength show the impact of such litigation. As early as the 1960s,
manufacturers have been sued over the inadequacy of vehicle
roof strength. 141 After plaintiffs successfully brought a lawsuit
against Buick when the roof of one such vehicle collapsed crushing a passenger, the court held that “it is the obligation of the automobile manufacturer to provide more than a movable platform
capable of transporting passengers from one point to another.” 142
In 1971, following this and similar lawsuits, the National Highway Safety Bureau (the precursor to NHTSA) started developing
its initial safety standards regulating roof strength to ensure that
vehicles could withstand pressure on their roofs if they were
forced to roll over during an accident. 143
Recently, a passenger won one of the largest court judgments linking vehicle roof strength to a severe injury in a rollover
accident. A Chevy Blazer passenger won a lawsuit for $18.6 million against General Motors when her vehicle rolled over and its
roof collapsed more than eight inches paralyzing her. 144 After her
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victory in the lawsuit, the passenger said, “I hope my case will be
reason for GM to improve the roofs of these vehicles so what
happened to me doesn’t continue to happen.” 145
In 2009, NHTSA approved a rule that imposed even
stronger standards for roof strength. The rule, which has recently
come into effect, imposes certain strength to weight standards,
maximum intrusion limits and headroom requirements. 146 The
new regulation doubles the current roof strength requirement for
light weight vehicles, specifying that both the driver and passenger side of the roof must be capable of withstanding a force equal
to three times the weight of the vehicle. 147 Heavier vehicles,
which have never been regulated, must now be able to withstand
weight equal to 1.5 times the weight of the vehicle on each side of
the roof. 148 Upon announcement of the rule, the Secretary of
Transportation stated, “Rollovers are the deadliest crashes on our
highways and today’s rule will help occupants survive these horrific events.” 149
3. Airbags
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Feb. 1, 2014).
145
Id.
146
NHTSA, Press Release, U.S. DOT Doubles Roof Strength Standard for
Light
Vehicles
(Apr.
30,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2009/U.S.+DOT+Doub
les+Roof+Strength+Standard+for+Light+Vehicles,+Announces+First+Ever+S
tandards+for+Heavier+Vehicles.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, Driven to Safety: How Litigation Spurred Auto Safety Innovations 8 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xbcr/justice/Driven_to_Safety.pdf.
151
Id.
152
Id.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 79 Side B

As previously discussed, the failure of vehicles to include
airbags was a matter heavily litigated in accidents where evidence existed that the inclusion of an airbag could have prevented an injury or death. Vehicle manufacturers began developing
airbag technology in the 1950s and started testing the technology
in vehicles in the 1960s. 150 General Motors even offered airbags as
an option in certain models by the mid-1970s. 151 By 1988, however, only 2% of new vehicles were equipped with airbags.152
While the majority of courts sided with manufacturers
agreeing that such litigation was preempted by federal crash pro-
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tection standards specifically addressing airbags and related safety technology, a minority of courts found in the opposite. These
courts allowed plaintiffs to argue the merits of their lawsuits, in
particular that vehicle manufacturers knew that the absence of
airbags made vehicles less safe. As a result of these lawsuits and
increased publicity surrounding the subject, NHTSA required all
automotive vehicles sold in the United States to be equipped with
either an airbag or automatic seat belts by 1990. 153 In 1991, Congress enacted the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act providing that NHTSA require both driver and passenger
airbags in all vehicles by 1998. 154 Vehicle manufacturers have
since been installing airbags as a standard safety feature.
4. Tires

153
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Theroff, supra note 91, at 619.
Id.
155
John Greenwald, Inside the Ford/Firestone Fight, TIME, May 29,
2001, http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,128198,00.html.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Robert Manor, Firestone Settles Tire Suit in Texas, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Aug. 25, 2001), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-0825/news/0108250169_1_bridgestone-marisa-rodriguez-firestone-tires.
159
Id.
160
NHTSA,
Firestone
Tire
Recall,
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/PR/FirestoneRecall (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
154
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Ford Explorers equipped with Firestone tires were blamed
for dozens of deaths and hundreds of injuries. 155 It was alleged
that the tread on tires would separate causing vehicles to rollover. 156 In 2000, as a result of this alleged defect, Ford faced hundreds of lawsuits seeking hundreds of millions of dollars. 157 Some
of these lawsuits were unsuccessful, some settled out of court and
a few earned favorable verdicts. In a Texas case, a plaintiff
sought $1 billion in damages after suffering permanent paralysis
when a faulty tire caused her Ford Explorer to roll over. 158 The
plaintiff ultimately settled for a reported $7.5 million. 159
With lawsuits pending and an increasing number of complaints being received through its channels, in May 2000,
NHTSA issued a letter to Ford and Firestone requesting information on the high rate of tire failure on certain vehicle models
such as Ford Explorers. 160 Ford investigated the matter and
found that certain models of 15-inch Firestone tires had exceed-
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ingly high failure rates, in particular with tread pealing off. 161 The
problems were linked to particular plant in Illinois that ultimately closed. 162 In August 2000, Ford and Firestone announced jointly that Firestone would recall approximately 14.4 million tires
that contained a safety-related defect of which it was estimated
that 6.5 million of the tires were still on the road. 163 The recall involved replacing tires manufactured at the closed plant with similar tires manufactured at different plants, other Firestone models
and competitor’s tires. 164
In addition to forcing Firestone to recall and replace millions of defective tires, investigations into Ford and Firestone
have also been attributed with leading to the TREAD Act. In
2001, the United States Congress conducted a series of hearings
into the matter. 165 At these hearings, it was asserted that Ford
and Firestone had misrepresented important facts in reports related to the safety defect involved in the matter. 166 It was believed
that laws sanctioning manufacturers misleading reports would
help prevent NHTSA from receiving such reports in the future.
The TREAD Act, which was then adopted, now provides criminal penalties for misleading the Secretary of Transportation with
respect to safety defects. 167 While the TREAD Act did not apply
retroactively to Ford and Firestone, a manufacturer of tires or
other automotive parts will now be fined for behavior similar to
that employed by Ford and Firestone.

II. TOYOTA MDL CASE BACKGROUND

Prior to unintended acceleration being alleged in certain
Toyota and Lexus model vehicles manufactured by Toyota Motor
Corp., unintended acceleration had already been alleged in vehicles manufactured by other companies. 168 During the 1980s,
161
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Id.
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act of 2000, 49 U.S.C.A §§ 30101-30183 (West 2014).
168
John Holusha, A Hard Sell for Audi, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 24, 1988),
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/24/business/a-hard-sell-foraudi.html?scp=14&sq=audi%20sudden%20acceleration&st=cse.
162
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B. Toyota Motor Corporation Recalls
The most high-profile Toyota Motor Corp. unintended acceleration occurred at the end of 2009. On August 28, 2009, an
off-duty California Highway Patrol Officer Saylor lost control of
169
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Id.
Andreas Cremer & Tom Lavell, Audi 1980s Scare May Mean Lost
Generation for Toyota Sales, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2010, 8:02 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aFAbB4LZ3h6
A.
171
Out of Control, 60 MINUTES (CBS television broadcast Nov. 23, 1986).
172
Id.
173
Cremer, supra note 170.
174
Id.
175
Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 2, at 1444.
170
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NHTSA investigated reports of sudden surges of power in several
dozen models manufactured by nearly two-dozen different companies. 169 While some of these alleged incidents were supported
by reputable sources, one set of allegations had been highly criticized for its lack of scientific rigor and devastating impact on the
manufacturer of the vehicles for which it was alleged. 170
In November of 1986, 60 Minutes aired a segment entitled
“Out of Control,” featuring interviews with several individuals
who were suing Audi for such surges. 171 The report featured footage of an Audi vehicle surging out of control while the brake pedal was depressed. It was later learned that producers of the 60
Minutes segment had modified the vehicle by fitting a canister of
compressed air on the passenger-side floor that was linked by a
hose to a hole drilled into the transmission. 172
NHTSA later determined that the majority of unintended
acceleration reports, including those brought by the individuals
interviewed in the 60 Minutes segment were the result of driver
error. 173 However, in what many have attributed to the negative
publicity caused by the 60 Minutes segment and other media,
Audi’s United States’ sales, which had reached nearly 80,000 vehicles in 1985, dropped to below 13,000 vehicles in 1991 and remained at the level for several years. 174 This represented a decrease in sales by 69%. 175
With the history of unintended acceleration allegations as
a backdrop, it is understandable that manufacturers and regulators were originally skeptical of similar allegations when they first
arose with Toyota Motor Corp.’s Toyota and Lexis model vehicles.
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Victims’ Family’s Plea to Toyota, CBS NEWS (Feb. 24, 2010, 7:36 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500202_162-6237847.html.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Chris Woodyard, Toyota to Pay $1.1B in ‘Unintended Acceleration’
Cases,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
26,
2012,
8:27
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2012/12/26/toyota-unintendedacceleration-runaway-cars/1792477/; Victims’ Family’s Plea to Toyota, supra
note 176.
184
Victims’ Family’s Plea to Toyota, supra note 176.
185
Id.
186
Id.
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a Lexus he was driving and crashed with his whole family in the
vehicle. 176 As the vehicle accelerated to over 100 miles per hour,
the officer called 911 asserting that his vehicle was accelerating
and could not be stopped. 177 In the call a passenger can be heard
saying, “We’re in trouble. There’s no brakes.” 178 Immediately before the vehicle crashed, the officer stated, “We’re approaching
the intersection. Hold on! Hold on and pray. Pray!” The vehicle
then crashed killing the driver and passengers. 179
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation inspected the
crash site on September 3, 2009. The vehicle was subsequently
inspected by the NHTSA Vehicle Research and Test Center.
NHTSA filed a report on September 30, 2009 where investigators
explained the following. First, the vehicle was a loaned Lexus
traveling at a very high rate of speed that failed to stop. 180 Second, the driver was a 19-year veteran of the California Highway
Patrol. 181 Third, the cause of the crash was “very excessive
speed.” 182 Finally, the customer who had previously used the
same loaner vehicle reported an unwanted acceleration event of
speeds in excess of eighty miles per hour. 183
The San Diego County Sherriff’s Department also inspected the vehicle and saw evidence that “all-weather” heavyduty rubber floor mats trapped the accelerator pedal. 184 According to the San Diego County Sherriff’s Department, it was apparent that the floor mats were not appropriate for the vehicle, had
been stacked in the driver footwell and were unsecured. 185 Ultimately, the crash was blamed on the floor mats forcing the accelerator pedal down. The ability to perform tests on the vehicle,
however, was limited because it had been completely destroyed. 186
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Hibah Yousuf, Toyota: 3.8 Million Cars with Risky Floor Mats, CNN
MONEY
(Oct.
2,
2009,
3:05
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/29/news/companies/toyota_lexus_floor_mats/.
188
Healey, supra note 64.
189
Id.
190
Customer FAQs Regarding the Sticking Accelerator Pedal and Floor
Mat
Pedal
Entrapment
Recalls,
http://pressroom.toyota.com/article_print.cfm?article_id=1861 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2014).
191
Healey, supra note 64.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Toyota Announces Details of Remedy to Address Potential Accelerator
Pedal
Entrapment,
http://web.archive.org/web/20091221013729/http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/t
ms/toyota/toyota-consumer-safety-advisory-102572.aspx (last visited Feb. 1,
2014).
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At this time, other incidents where drivers experienced
similar phenomenon were being reported and the issue of unintended acceleration quickly grabbed national headlines. Initially,
Toyota Motor Corp. asserted that these events, including the Saylor crash could be attributed to floor mat entrapment that involved dislodged floor mats trapping accelerator pedals forcing
vehicles to accelerate out of control. Toyota Motor Corp. and
NHTSA warned drivers to remove all-weather heavy-duty rubber floor mats because of the possibility that the mats would depress accelerator pedals leading to unintended acceleration. 187 In
November 2009, there was a recall to correct what was referred
to as “pedal entrapment” whereby a floor mat would slip into the
floor pedal well and apply pressure to the accelerator pedal. 188
This involved Toyota Motor Corp. issuing a floor mat recall affecting 4.2 million Toyota and Lexus model vehicles which was
later expanded to include 5.3 million vehicles. 189 The recall involved replacing all-weather heavy-duty rubber floor mats with
thinner mats. 190
Even after floor mats were recalled, however, Toyota Motor Corp. continued to receive reports of unintended acceleration. 191 Following these reports, in January 2010, Toyota Motor
Corp. informed NHTSA that there may also be a problem with
sticking accelerator pedals. 192 As directed by NHTSA, Toyota
Motor Corp. initiated a recall for sticking accelerator pedals affecting 2.3 million vehicles. 193 The recall involved shaving down
the accelerator pedal to reduce the risk of floor mat entrapment. 194
On February 16, 2010, the Department of Transportation
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ordered Toyota Motor Corp. to turn over documents related to its
recalls so that NHTSA could determine how long the company
knew of safety defects before taking action. 195 In April of 2010, as
a result of NHTSA’s investigation into these documents and other sources, Toyota Motor Corp. agreed to pay the maximum penalty of approximately $16 million for failure to notify NHTSA
within five days of learning about its “sticky” accelerator pedal
defect. 196 In December 2010, Toyota was fined another maximum
of approximately $16 million by the Department of Transportation for the manner in which the company handled its recalls related to floor mats that could trap accelerator pedals. 197
C. Congressional Hearings

195
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Ben Rooney, U.S. Demands Toyota Recall Documents, CNN MONEY
(Feb.
16,
2010,
3:27
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/16/autos/Toyota_NHTSA/.
196
NHTSA, Press Release, Toyota Motor Corp. Will Pay $32.425 Million
in Civil Penalties as Result of Two Department of Transportation Investigations (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.nhtsa.gov/PR/DOT-216-10.
197
Id.
198
Toyota President Testifies Before Congress, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 24,
2010,
7:55
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/02/24/toyota.hearing.updates/.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Sean
Kane
et
al.,
Toyota
Unintended
Acceleration,
SAFETYRESEARCH.NET
1
(Feb.
5,
2010),
available
at
http://www.safetyresearch.net/Library/ToyotaSUA020510FINAL.pdf.
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On February 23, 2010, congressional hearings started
where Toyota Motor Corp. executives appeared before Congress.
The President and CEO of Toyota Motor Corp. testified before
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the
United States House of Representatives. 198 The President and
Chief Executive Officer of Toyota Motors North America testified in Senate Sub-Committee hearings. 199 Both apologized for
the recent safety concerns and related recalls. 200
The congressional hearings also included expert testimony
from a consumer advocate, Sean Kane of Safety Research &
Strategies. He presented findings based on his organization’s
February 2010 report, “Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration.” The report explained that unintended acceleration had
been a longstanding problem with Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles. 201 According to the report since 1999, over 2,000 Toyota and
Lexus owners reported to NHTSA, the media, the courts and to
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Id.
204
Id. at 2.
205
Rep. Bart Stupak, Update on Toyota and NHTSA’s Response to the
Problem of Sudden Unintended Acceleration, ENERGY COMMERCE 1 (2010),
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Fina
l-Transcript-OI-Toyota-NHTSA-Response-Sudden-Unintended-Acceleration2010-5-20.pdf.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
203
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Safety Research & Strategies that their vehicles have accelerated
suddenly and unexpectedly. 202 Moreover, according to the report,
these incidents had resulted in 815 crashes, 341 injuries and 19
deaths. 203 The report also cast doubt on Toyota Motor Corp.’s
ability to properly identify the problems and fix them, explaining
that nearly 1,000 reports came from drivers of vehicle models that
were not recalled and that drivers reported unintended acceleration even when no all-weather floor mats were present in their
vehicles. 204
Further, a scientific expert presented at the congressional
hearings. Professor David Gilbert of Southern Illinois University,
who was also separately interviewed by ABC news, explained
that he could induce sudden unintended acceleration in a Toyota
Motor Corp. vehicle and the phenomenon would not even trigger
an error code. 205 Dr. Gilbert explained that there was an electronic design flaw in Toyota Motor Corp.’s “Fail Safe” system. 206 Gilbert said the flaw prevents the car’s onboard computer from detecting and stopping certain short circuits that can trigger sudden
speed surges. 207 Because the computers would not record an error
code in this situation, Dr. Gilbert said that they could not activate
the fail safe system designed to shut down the power. 208 According to Dr. Gilbert, the flaw was related to Toyota Motor Corp.’s
Electronic Throttle Control (“ETC”), a type of vehicle technology
that relays electronic signals between the accelerator pedal to the
throttle rather than having a mechanical linkage. 209 Dr. Gilbert’s
work was reviewed by other academics who viewed the research
as “sensible” and “reasonable” starting point for investigations,
although not necessarily conclusive. 210
Around this time, the Wall Street Journal published an article explaining the difficulty in using Toyota Motor Corp.’s
Event Data Recorders (“EDR”s) to evaluate allegations of unin-
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Dionne Searcey & Kate Linebaugh, Toyota Woes Put Focus on Black
Box,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(Feb.
14,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732337520457826918106
0493750.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Chester Dawson, Toyota Again World’s Largest Auto Maker, WALL ST.
J.,
(Jan.
28,
2013,
7:16
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732337520457826918106
0493750.
216
STUPAK, supra note 205, at 1-2.
217
Id.
218
See Evaluation of the Gilbert Demonstration, EXPONENT (2010),
available
at
http://pressroom.toyota.com/images/document/GILBERTEvaluation_of_the_Gilbert_Demonstration_1_.pdf (offering a detailed analysis
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tended acceleration. EDRs are devices installed in automobiles
that record technical vehicle and occupant information for a brief
time period before, during and after a crash. 211 EDRs may record
such information as pre-crash vehicle dynamics and system status, driver inputs, vehicle crash signature, restraint usage/deployment status, and post-crash data such as the activation
of an automatic collision notification system. 212 However, while
U.S. automobile manufacturers have made their EDRs easily
readable by third party devices, only one reader existed for Toyota Motor Corp. model vehicles and was located at Toyota Motor
Corp.’s headquarters. 213 Toyota Motor Corp. insisted that the situation was temporary, as it was still working on its EDRs. Nonetheless, the inability to interpret EDR data hindered analysis of
alleged unintended acceleration events. 214
Allegations against Toyota Motor Corp. were especially
damaging for the manufacturer because the company had built
its reputation on safety. In the United States, Toyota Motor Corp.
had aggressively marketed its vehicles as synonymous with safety, which helped it become one of the country’s top selling automobile manufacturers. 215 Toyota Motor Corp. therefore hired a
public relations firm to help it rebrand its image. 216 Polls conducted by the firm revealed that “debunking” the credibility of Dr.
Gilbert’s testing was critical for restoring confidence among educated consumers and reassuring audiences that ETC is in fact
“NOT” an issue. 217
Toyota Motor Corp. hired Exponent, a scientific consulting firm, to evaluate Dr. Gilbert’s testing. On March 8, 2010,
Toyota held a press conference to release a report, entitled “Evaluation of the Gilbert Demonstration” prepared by Exponent. 218
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At the press event, before Exponent presented its findings, a
Toyota Motor Corp. spokesman attacked Dr. Gilbert’s work for
being, as the spokesman referred to it as, “paid for by an advocate
for trial lawyers.” 219 Exponent then defended Toyota Motor
Corp.’s ETC systems and explained that it failed to reproduce
unintended acceleration in any of its experimentation. Further,
according to Exponent, which focused on duplicating the electronic interference induced by Dr. Gilbert, “for such an event to
happen in the real world requires a sequence of faults that is extraordinarily unlikely.”220
In addition to continuing to defend its ETC systems,
Toyota Motor Corp. also refocused its safety campaigns. Rather
than simply advertising its vehicles as safe or focusing on one
safety feature in particular, Toyota Motor Corp. marketed itself
as the only full-line manufacturer of vehicles with five safety features that it labeled its Star Safety System. The Star Safety System included: (1) vehicle stability control; (2) traction control; (3)
antilock brakes; (4) electronic brake-force distribution; and (5)
brake assist. 221
D. NHTSA and NASA Study
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of Dr. Gilberts demonstration).
219
STUPAK, supra note 205, at 2.
220
EXPONENT, supra note 218, at vi-vii; Toyota asserted that the firm was
an independent expert that evaluated the potential for unintended acceleration
in its vehicles and found nothing supporting allegations of such. The media,
however, criticized Exponent as being biased and the methodology used by the
firm was also attacked. STUPAK, supra note 205, at 2. The Chairman of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce said that “[t]he Exponent report on Dr.
Gilbert’s research was a hit job, not solid science.” STUPAK, supra note 205, at
2.
221
Dexter Ford, What’s So Special About Toyota’s Star Safety System,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
29,
2010),
http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/whats-so-special-about-toyotasstar-safety-system/?_r=0.
222
NHTSA-NASA Study of Unintended Acceleration in Toyota Vehicles,
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After the congressional hearings, significant controversy
existed as to whether all causes of unintended acceleration could
be linked to the mechanical failures already identified by Toyota
Motor Corp. or whether there were also electronic failures resulting in unintended acceleration. The United States Congress therefore requested that NHTSA and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (“NASA”) conduct a study evaluating possible causes of unintended acceleration. 222 Pursuant to this re-
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quest, NHTSA and NASA’s conducted such a study over a period of ten months, analyzing several potential causes of unintended acceleration. 223
A report summarizing NHTSA and NASA’s findings was
released to the public in February of 2011. The report revealed
testing of both possible mechanical and electrical failures, including what was asserted as the most exacting study of motor vehicle
ETC systems ever conducted by a government agency. 224
NHTSA asserted that it had identified two types of mechanical
defects as causes of unintended acceleration, pedal entrapment
and sticky pedal which had both already been addressed by
Toyota Motor Corp. 225 No electronic defects, however, were identified. 226 Instead NASA found that many safety features were designed into Toyota Motor Corp.’s ETC systems to prevent unintended acceleration and, if faults are detected, safe modes are
initiated which limit acceleration such as fuel cut strategies.
NASA also did not find flaws in the software code controlling
Toyota Motor Corp.’s ETC systems or that electromagnetic interference would result in unintended acceleration when it exposed
vehicles to interference at above current certification standards.227
In conducting their investigations, NHTSA and NASA also reviewed consumer complaints. When the agencies made their
report public, both agencies discussed the recent large increase in
consumer complaints of unintended acceleration. According to
NHTSA and NASA, publicity surrounding NHTSA’s investigation was the major contributor to the large increase in complaints, related recalls and the congressional hearings. 228

A. Organizational Plan and Appointment of Counsel
On March 5, 2010, approximately 150 lawyers assembled
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http://www.nhtsa.gov/UA (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
223
Id.
224
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF TOYOTA ELECTRONIC THROTTLE CONTROL
(ETC) SYSTEMS at vii (2011). See also, NHTSA-NASA Study of Unintended
Acceleration in Toyota Vehicles, http://www.nhtsa.gov/UA (last visited Feb. 1,
2014).
225
NHTSA, supra note 224, at vii.
226
Id. at vii-viii.
227
Id. at vii.
228
Id. at viii.
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in Chicago to discuss sharing experts and legal strategy in litigation against Toyota Motor Corp. for unintended acceleration, in
what at that time included over 80 lawsuits. 229 Following the
meeting and the fallout from the congressional hearings, the
number of lawsuits continued to rise sharply. 230 On April 9, 2010,
a U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation decided that approximately 200 lawsuits against Toyota Motor Corp. for issues
related to sudden unintended acceleration would be consolidated
and heard in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. 231
At the end of April, plaintiffs’ attorneys began to apply to
serve as lead counsel for the Toyota MDL that ultimately reached
in excess of 50 applicants. On April 30, 2010, three plaintiffs’ attorneys who were assigned as temporary lead counsel and Toyota
Motor Corp.’s lead counsel filed a joint preliminary report outlining committees that should be established to manage the litigation. 232 Then, on May 14th, 2010, some of the county’s most famous plaintiffs’ attorneys appeared in the Central District of
California before the presiding judge, Judge James Selna, to
compete for selection of lead plaintiffs counsel in what was at
that time a high profile and potentially lucrative case. 233
Plaintiffs argued for a robust litigation committee structure which Judge Selna granted in his Order No. 2: Adoption of
Organization Plan and Appointment of Counsel. First, Judge
Selna appointed a liaison committee for personal injury/wrongful
death cases, consisting of two co-lead counsel and seven additional members. 234 Second, Judge Selna appointed a lead counsel
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Amanda Bronstad, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Jockey for Venue in Massive
Toyota Litigation, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Mar. 10, 2010),
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JOURNAL,
Apr.
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2010,
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Id.
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Amanda Bronstad, Panel Suggests a Structure for Unwieldy Toyota
Litigation,
NATIONAL
LAW
JOURNAL
(May
3,
2010),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202457606286.
233
Amanda Bronstad, Judge Agrees to Expand Plaintiffs’ Committees in
Toyota
MDL,
NATIONAL
LAW
JOURNAL
(May
14,
2010),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202458281456.
234
Order No. 2: Adoption of Organization Plan and Appointment of
Counsel 2 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2010); Appointments for plaintiffs’ liaison committee for the personal injury/wrongful death cases included co-lead counsel
Elizabeth J. Cabraser and Mark P. Robinson, Jr. Members included Lewis S.
Eidson, W. Mark Lanier, Richard D. McCune, W. Daniel “Dee” Miles, Brian
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for the economic loss cases, consisting of two co-leads who represent consumer plaintiffs, individual purchasers of vehicles, and
one co-lead who represents non-consumer plaintiffs, such as dealerships. Six additional members were also appointed to economic
loss cases. 235 Third, Judge Selna appointed a core discovery committee, consisting of the co-lead counsel for the personal injury/wrongful death cases and the co-lead counsel for the economic
loss plaintiffs. 236 Fourth, recognizing that separate state and other
federal litigation existed, Judge Selna appointed three liaison
counsel to the state cases and other types of federal cases to coordinate between the core discovery committee and the state and
other federal litigation. 237
Although Judge Selna recognized that there were different
personal injury/wrongful death plaintiffs and economic loss
plaintiffs, Judge Selna did not see a conflict in counsel representing both personal injury/wrongful death plaintiffs and economic
loss plaintiffs, nor in representing both consumer economic loss
plaintiffs and non-consumer economic loss plaintiffs. Here Judge
Selna reasoned that because of Toyota Motor Corp.’s depth of financial resources, plaintiffs were not for instance competing for a
limited pool of resources to fund any judgment. 238 Judge Selna also stated that he had addressed part of the concern regarding potential conflict by appointing different counsel to leadership positions for each type of claimant. 239
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Panish, Hunter J. Shkolnik and Donald H. Slavick. Order No. 2: Adoption of
Organization Plan and Appointment of Counsel 6 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2010).
235
Id. at 2; Appointments for plaintiffs’ lead counsel committee for economic loss class actions included co-lead counsel Steven W. Berman (consumer), Frank M. Pitre (non-consumer) and Marc M. Seltzer (consumer). Members
included Richard J. Arsenault (non-consumer), Benjamin L. Bailey (consumer), Stanley M. Chesley (consumer), Jayne Conroy (consumer), Michael Louis
Kelly (consumer) and Jerome L. Ringler (non-consumer). Id.
236
Id. at 2.
237
Id. at 6-7; Appointments for plaintiffs’ liaison counsel to state and other types of federal cases included Wylie A. Aitken, Dawn M. Barrios and
Gretchen M. Nelson. Order No. 2: Adoption of Organization Plan and Appointment of Counsel 6-7 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2010); Other state litigation has
included a case in the California state court. Other federal litigation has included a class action brought by owners of Toyota Motor Corp. stock. The Orange County District Attorney also brought a separate action.
238
Id. at 4-5.
239
Id. at 5.
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B. Plaintiffs’ Claims
1. Personal Injury/Wrongful Death

C M
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240
Complaint for Damages at ii, Spisto v. Toyota Motor North America
et. al., No. CV11-04479 CBM (RZx) (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2011).
241
Id. at 2-3.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 1-2.
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On May 24, 2011, counsel representing plaintiffs who suffered a personal injury or wrongful death filed a Complaint for
Damages (hereinafter referred to as, “Personal Injury Complaint”). The Personal Injury Complaint advanced causes of action for: (1) Negligence; (2) Strict Products Liability: Design Defect; (3) Strict Products Liability: Failure to Warn; (4) Breach of
Implied Warranty of Merchantability; and (5) Fraudulent Concealment. 240 While each cause of action required a showing of its
own necessary elements, overall the Personal Injury Complaint
generally sought to show that Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles were
defective and that Toyota Motor Corp. was aware or should have
been aware of this defect.
In arguing that a defect existed, counsel cited to the mechanical failures already recognized by Toyota Motor Corp. and
electronic failures that the manufacturer did not acknowledge.
According to the Personal Injury Complaint, Toyota Motor
Corp.’s ETC systems are susceptible to malfunction and Toyota
Motor Corp. did not include adequate safety technology if such a
malfunction occurred. 241 As alleged in the Personal Injury Complaint, certain Toyota Motor Corp. models were defective because, among other allegations: (1) “the [ETC systems] and its
components are highly susceptible to malfunction caused by various electronic failures;” and (2) they “lack a brake override system
[“BOS”], meaning that the driver is unable to manually stop or
slow the engine during [un unintended acceleration] incident by
stepping on the breaks.” 242
To demonstrate Toyota Motor Corp. had knowledge of a
defect, counsel argued that Toyota Motor Corp. officials had both
actual and constructive knowledge of both mechanical and electronic defects. First, some internal reports showed that unintended acceleration was linked to mechanical defects and other reports indicated that electronic defects were at least a contributing
factor. 243 Second, with respect to electronic defects, installing
BOS had become standard in other manufacturer’s vehicles with
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ETC systems. 244 Similar to arguments that had swayed juries in
past product liability lawsuits, plaintiffs’ counsel also explained
that corporate officials knew that installing BOS would prevent
unintended acceleration, but nonetheless decided to forgo installing the technology on their vehicles. 245
The Personal Injury Complaint also sought punitive damages. According to plaintiffs’ counsel, Toyota Motor Corp. had
allegedly been aware of the dangers associated with its ETC systems and tried to mask these dangers rather than take appropriate corrective actions. 246 Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that punitive
damages would serve to further punish Toyota Motor Corp. and
deter future wrongful conduct. 247
2. Economic Loss

244

C M
Y K
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Id. at 3; According to plaintiffs’ counsel, from at least 2002, Toyota
Motor Corp. “knew or should have known that the state of the art in automotive industry for electronic throttle control systems included the installation of
a brake override system.” Id.
245
Id.; In sum, “the absence of a fail-safe brake override system is particularly dangerous given the susceptibility of the [ETC systems] to malfunction in
Toyota vehicles.” Id. at 9.
246
Id. at 47-48.
247
Id. at 49.
248
Amended Economic Loss Master Consolidated Complaint, In Re
Toyota Motor Corp., No. 8:10ML2151 JVS (FMOx), ii, (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27,
2010).
249
Id. at ii-xviii.
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On October 27, 2010, counsel representing consumer and
non-consumer plaintiffs filed an Amended Economic Master
Consolidated Complaint (hereinafter referred to as, “Economic
Loss Complaint”). The Economic Loss Complaint, filed before
the Personal Injury Complaint, was filed as a class action representing a broad group of plaintiffs. 248 The Economic Loss Complaint further included numerous causes of action, such as Breach
of Express Warranty, Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Revocation of Acceptance, Breach of Contract/Common
Law Warranty, Fraud by Concealment and Unjust Enrichment.
Among these numerous causes of action, were a myriad of consumer protection causes of action based on federal and state laws,
such as Violations of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Violation of
the California Unfair Competition Law, and Violation of the California False Advertising Law.249 Again, while each cause of action requires proving separate elements, in the Economic Loss
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Complaint counsel essentially argued that parties purchased vehicles that Toyota Motor Corp. advertised as being exceedingly
safe but suffered an economic harm when incidents of unintended
acceleration revealed that vehicles were not as safe as advertised. 250
In arguing that Toyota Motor Corp. misrepresented the
safety of its vehicles, the Economic Loss Complaint dedicated
pages to describing Toyota Motor Corp.’s general assertions
about the safety of its vehicles and specific assertions about the
safety of its ETC technology. 251 According to plaintiffs’ counsel,
“Toyota has consistently marketed is vehicles as ‘safe’ and proclaimed that safety is one of its ‘highest corporate priorities.’”
Plaintiffs’ counsel further alleged that Toyota Motor Corp. had
promoted ETC systems as providing “stable vehicle control.” 252
Excerpts from annual reports, press kits, brochures, press releases, warranty manuals, magazine advertisements, and commercials are provided to corroborate plaintiffs’ assertions. 253
In arguing that plaintiffs suffered a loss, counsel explained
that all purchasers of defective Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles
overpaid. As explained by counsel, “A car purchased or leased
under the reasonable assumption that it is ‘safe’ as advertised is
worth more than a care know to be subject to the risk of an uncontrollable and possibly life-threatening SUA event.” 254 Counsel
further provided data demonstrating that as incidents of unin250

Id. at 40.
Id. at 81.
252
Id.
253
Id. at 81-94; While critical to the Personal Injury Complaint’s breach
of warranty cause of action but not necessarily the traditional tort causes of action, plaintiffs’ personal injury/ wrongful death counsel also explained that
Toyota Motor Corp. had misrepresented the safety of its vehicles and these
misrepresentations have contributed to a decrease in vehicle value following
allegations of unintended acceleration. According to the Personal Injury Complaint, “[s]ince at least 1998, Toyota has continuously promised trust and safety
to prospective purchasers and the American public.” Id. at 8. “Toyota holds its
brand out as synonymous with innovation, quality and reliability, claiming
that safety and satisfaction are its top priorities.” Id. The Personal Injury
Complaint further asserted that magazines that evaluate vehicle value showed
that Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles depreciated significantly when incidents of
unintended acceleration were being reported. Id. at 17. For instance, following
Toyota Motor Corp.’s recalls, Kelley Blue Book lowered its estimated price for
recalled models by 2.5% to 3.5%, enough to lower the value of each vehicle by
between $250 and $800. Chris Isidore, Toyota’s Next Problem: Lawsuits, CNN
MONEY
(Feb.
10,
2010)
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/09/news/companies/toyota_lawsuits/.
254
Id. at 184.
251
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tended acceleration were made public, the value of Toyota Motor
Corp. vehicles “materially diminished.” 255 In addition to showing
marked economic loss in Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles, data also
showed that Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles had depreciated at a
considerably higher rate than vehicles produced by other manufacturers. For instance, during specific time periods, Camrys had
lost more than 2.5 times the value lost by Nissan’s Altimas and
Corollas had lost nearly 4 times the value lost by Nissan’s Sentras. 256
C. Toyota Motor Corporation’s Defense

255
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Id.
Id. at 184-85.
257
Mark Rechtin, Toyota’s Towering Defense Task, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS
(June
25,
2012),
http://www.autonews.com/article/20120625/OEM01/306259968/1143#axzz2kx
6ipywK.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id.
256
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Toyota Motor Corp.’s defense team was composed of inside and outside counsel. The in-house team was led by the General Counsel for Toyota Motors North America. According to interviews conducted and reported by Automotive News in the
middle of 2012, the in-house team dictated the overall strategy for
the defense and worked on settlement negotiations. 257 On the other hand, outside counsel, responded to plaintiffs’ pleadings. 258 Inhouse and outside counsel communicated daily. 259 While Toyota
Motor Corp. was reluctant to reveal information on its costs,
based on the size of the team, it was estimated that the defense
could have cost Toyota Motor Corp. over $1 million in attorney
time alone. 260
When pressed for their defense strategy by Automotive
News, Toyota Motor Corp.’s team explained that in arguing the
merits of a possible case it was planning to base its arguments
largely on NHTSA and NASA’s scientific studies. 261 The General
Counsel for Toyota Motors North America explained, “Factually,
I don’t see too many issues we can’t get by.” 262 “If a bunch of
rocket scientists couldn’t find anything wrong with our cars, I’m
not too worried about plaintiff lawyers.” 263 The General Counsel
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Id.
Id.
266
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Toyota Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Economic Loss Master Consolidated Complaint; Order Granting in Part and Denying Part Motion to Strike
14-28 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2011).
267
Id. at 14; Article III of the United States constitution requires that a
plaintiff has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from
a defendant’s actions.
268
Id.
269
Id.
265
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for Toyota Motors North America further explained that Toyota
Motor Corp. would not compromise Toyota Motor Corp.’s reputation for engineering and vehicle quality. 264 Toyota Motor
Corp.’s team further insisted that it was willing to fight suits to
the bitter end in order to protect the company’s reputation. 265
After plaintiffs filed the Economic Loss Complaint, Toyota Motor Corp. filed a motion to dismiss and motion to strike. On
May 13, 2011, Judge Selna issued an Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part the Toyota Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Economic Loss Master Consolidated
Complaint and Order Granting in Part and Denying Part Motion
to Strike. The order evaluated arguments made by Toyota Motor
Corp. that sufficient standing did not exist for various claims
made by plaintiffs and that certain statements were inaccurate
and should therefore be stricken. As the orders’ name indicates,
the court granted and denied in part both Toyota Motor Corp.’s
motions to dismiss and to strike. 266
Notable among the arguments evaluated was whether
plaintiffs had sufficient standing to sue. In its motion, Toyota
Motor Corp. argued that certain plaintiffs offered only “bare and
conclusory allegations of economic injury that do not constitute
sufficient factual allegations as to their own economic loss” and
should therefore be dismissed from the action. 267 Toyota Motor
Corp. further explained that an injury resulting in loss or overpayment that is tied to a “market effect” must occur at the time of
purchase, but plaintiffs “failed to provide any factual allegations
as to how the general ‘market effect’ actually resulted in them
overpaying for their vehicles.” 268 Toyota Motor Corp. said that in
some instances there was no proof that certain plaintiffs had sold
their vehicles at a loss or even attempted to sell their vehicles. 269
Citing Kwikset, plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that sufficient standing existed regardless of whether the sale of a vehicle had occurred or was anticipated. According to plaintiffs’ counsel, a par-
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ticular plaintiff “was personally exposed to advertisements that
emphasized safety, explains that those motivated her to purchase
her vehicle, and then concludes that she personally would not
have purchased her vehicle or paid as much for it had she known
the truth about the defects.” 270 The court decided that plaintiffs
met the general standing burdens imposed by the United States
Constitution, succinctly stating that “[a] vehicle with a defect is
worth less than one without a defect.” 271 Moreover, the court recognized that cognizable economic loss existed at least pursuant to
certain consumer protection causes of action 272 and refused to
specifically dismiss consumer protection causes of action for lack
of standing. 273
D. Discovery

270
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Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 17, 20.
272
Id.; “Because Plaintiffs allege that they would have made a different
purchasing decision but for Toyota’s misrepresentations, Plaintiffs have lost
‘money or property’ within the meaning of the [California Unfair Competition
Law] and [California False Advertising Law].” Id. at 29-30.
273
Id. at 27-28; The court also did not dismiss the implied warranty cause
of action, but reasoned that plaintiffs’ counsel overreached on its express warranty cause of action. Id. at 41-49.
274
Document review is a fundamental discovery task.
275
Amanda Bronstad, Judge Orders Toyota to Perform Document Dump,
NATIONAL
LAW
JOURNAL
(May
28,
2010),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202458960729.
271
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Discovery in the Toyota MDL was extensive. To manage
plaintiffs’ efforts, as previously explained, Judge Selna appointed
a core discovery committee consisting of co-lead counsel for the
personal injury/wrongful death cases and the co-lead counsel for
the economic loss plaintiffs. Responsibilities of members of the
discovery committee and other plaintiffs’ counsel included tasks
such as delegating and supervising document review. 274 While the
number of documents produced by Toyota Motor Corp. is not
readily available, the number was presumably enormous.
Demonstrating the extent of the total number of documents, in a
single order made in late May of 2010, Judge Selna required
Toyota Motor Corp. to turn over tens of thousands of pages of internal documents that the manufacturer had previously provided
to the United States Congress for Congress’ investigations into
the vehicles. 275
In addition to document review, plaintiffs’ counsel orga-

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 89 Side A

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Ezroj Article3.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014

5/21/2014 2:36 PM

Product Liability After Unintended Acceleration

511

nized dozens of depositions. By May 2012, plaintiffs had taken 60
depositions of Toyota Motor Corp. employees with many more
planned.276 Each deposition could take several days for plaintiffs
to prepare questions and Toyota Motor Corp. to prepare its witnesses. 277 If a deposition was conducted in Japanese, the deposition itself could take as long as ten days because a translator
would have to be obtained who can understand business and engineering terms in both English and Japanese. 278 Also, often times
documents cited in depositions could be in Japanese and simply
obtaining an English translation that all parties agreed on could
take weeks. 279
Toyota Motor Corp. was also entitled to depose the plaintiffs’ experts. Toyota Motor Corp. requested to depose over 200
crash victims, but Judge Selna dismissed this request as too speculative of an undertaking. 280 Preparing for and conducting remaining depositions scheduled by Toyota Motor Corp. could be
as time consuming as for those scheduled by plaintiffs.
In addition to the size of the Toyota MDL discovery and
language barriers encountered throughout the process, discovery
was further complicated by the varying rules governing each jurisdiction in and outside the United States. The different jurisdictions have different legal standards and sometimes they even conflict with one another. To evaluate and decide these matters,
which can be time consuming, judges sometimes find themselves
appointing special masters to decide on discovery disputes. 281 In
276
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Mark Rechtin, Toyota’s Towering Defense Task, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS
(June
25,
2012),
http://www.autonews.com/article/20120625/OEM01/306259968/1143#axzz2kx
6ipywK.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.; In 2012, CNN leaked a Japanese engineering document that plaintiffs’ counsel said demonstrated that Toyota Motor Corp. knew its vehicles accelerated out of control. Id. Under revised translation, however, the document
simply detailed a routine quality check Toyota Motor Corp. conducts during
vehicle development. The routine quality check deliberately attempts to make
prototype vehicles perform improperly. Id.
280
Id.
281
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure section 53 provides authority for appointing special masters. Section 53 provides that a court may appoint a master to: (A) perform duties consented by the parties, (B) hold trial proceedings
and make or recommend findings of fact on issues to be decided without a jury
if appoint is warranted by: (i) some exception condition; or (ii) the need to perform an accounting or resolved a difficult computation of damages; or (C) address pretrial and posttrial matters that cannot be effectively and timely ad-
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July 2010, JAMS, a private provider of mediation and arbitration
services announced that Judge Selna confirmed that two JAMS
neutrals, Justice John K. Trotter (Retired) and Justice Steven Jo.
Stone (Retired), would be Special Masters in the Toyota MDL. 282
While the costs of discovery was expensive, the costs were
only expected to increase with the Toyota MDL moving forward.
An attorney representing Toyota personal injury/wrongful death
plaintiffs explained that a large sum of money is expended to hire
experts. 283 According to this attorney, once these and certain other
pre-litigation costs are expended, parties may be forced to take
the case to trial rather than reaching a settlement. 284
E. Settlement

C M
Y K
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dressed by an available district judge or magistrate judge of the district. FED.
R. CIV. P. 53.
282
JAMS,
The
Resolution
Experts
(July
1,
2010),
http://www.jamsadr.com/jams-neutrals-justices-trotter-and-steven-stone-toserve-as-special-masters-in-toyota-multi-district-litigation-07-01-2010/.
283
Rechtin, supra note 257.
284
Id.
285
Settlement Agreement 10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2012) (order appointing
the Settlement Master).
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Chris Woodyard, Toyota to Pay $1.1B in ‘Unintended Acceleration’
Cases,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
26,
2012,
8:27PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2012/12/26/toyota-unintendedacceleration-runaway-cars/1792477/.
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In April 2012, Judge Selna appointed Patrick A. Junea as
settlement special master. 285 As such Mr. Junea’s responsibilities
were to include administering, coordinating and presiding over
settlement negotiations. 286 This specifically included the power to
order parties and/or party representatives to attend settlement
meetings. 287 On December 26, 2012, after years of litigation,
Toyota Motor Corp. and plaintiffs’ attorneys reached an agreement for a preliminary settlement for the Toyota MDL economic
loss claim. 288
Both plaintiffs and Toyota Motor Corp. praised the settlement. In a press release, the General Counsel for Toyota Motors North America said, “This agreement marks a significant
step forward for our company, one that will enable us to put more
of our energy, time and resources into Toyota Motor Corp.’s central focus: making the best vehicles we can for our customers and
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1. A cash payment for alleged loss upon certain disposition of a subject vehicle during the period from September 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010 or upon early lease
289
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Toyota Announces Settlement of Economic Loss Litigation that Provides
Value
to
Customers
(Dec.
26,
2012),
http://pressroom.toyota.com/releases/toyota+settlement+litigation+value+custo
mers+dec26.htm.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Toyota Agrees to Fund a Settlement of Unintended Acceleration Cases
Worth
Up
to
$1.4
Billion
(Dec.
26,
2012),
http://www.hbsslaw.com/newsroom/Toyota-Agrees-to-Fund-a-Settlement-ofUnintended-Acceleration-Cases-Worth-Up-to-1-4-Billion.
293
Id.
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doing everything we can to meet their needs.” 289 “In keeping with
our core principles, we have structured this agreement in ways
that work to put our customers first and demonstrate that they
can count on Toyota to stand behind our vehicles.” 290 The General Counsel for Toyota Motors North America further explained,
“This was a difficult decision – especially since reliable scientific
evidence and multiple independent evaluations have confirmed
the safety of Toyota Motor Corp.’s electronic throttle control systems. However, we concluded that turning the page on this legacy
legal issue through the positive steps we are taking is in the best
interests of the company, our employees, our dealers and, most of
all, our customers.” 291 One of the co-lead plaintiffs’ counsel said,
“After two years of intense work, including deposing hundreds of
engineers, pouring over thousands of documents and examining
millions of lines of software code, we are pleased that Toyota has
agreed to a settlement that was both extraordinarily hard fought
and is exceptionally far-reaching.” 292
Soon after, the settlement received preliminary approval
from Judge Selna and was set for final approval in July 2013. In
July 2013, final approval was granted for what ultimately totaled
a $1.6 billion settlement. 293 Pursuant to the settlement, which is
the largest automotive defect settlement in U.S. history, Toyota
Motor Corp. agreed to reimburse owners of certain Toyota and
Lexus vehicle models for losses in resale value following reports
of sudden unintended acceleration. Toyota Motor Corp. also
agreed to install brake override software on certain Toyota and
Lexus model vehicles.
Specifically, the Toyota Motor Corp. unintended acceleration settlement entitles class members to the following:
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termination following an alleged unintended acceleration event that was reported.
2. Installation of BOS in certain subject vehicles at no
charge.
3. A cash payment if a subject vehicle is not a hybrid
and is not eligible for a BOS.
4. Participation in a customer support program.
5. Other settlement benefits. 294
The court awarded plaintiff attorney’s fees of $200 million, plus an additional $27 million in costs and expenses. 295 Judge
Selna found such fees and costs reasonable in light of work done
on the case. In his June 2013 order, he said the “award of fees,
costs, and compensation is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 296

IV. TOYOTA MDL IMPACT
While NHTSA has achieved important safety gains over
the last half century, the Toyota MDL has shown NHTSA’s limi294
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See generally Toyota Economic Loss Settlement Website,
http://www.toyotaelsettlement.com/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
295
Id.
296
Other Toyota Motor Corp. cases have also been resolved. A couple of
months prior to Judge Selna finalizing the economic loss settlement, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office reached a settlement for sixteen million
dollars with the Toyota Motor Corp. Tony Rackauckas, the District Attorney,
said “The possibility of experiencing an unintended acceleration event during
Toyota’s crisis clearly scared many consumers.” “This settlement is an important step in holding Toyota accountable for the safety and security of their
customers.” The sixteen million dollars is to be used for various County public
service efforts and the reimbursement of certain attorney’s fees. OCDA
Rackauckas Announces Consumer Protection Settlement Over Unintended Acceleration
(April
5,
2013),
http://www.orangecountyda.com/home/index.asp?page=8&recordid=3466&ret
urnurl=index.asp%3Fpage%3D8%26pagenumber%3D1%26pagesize%3D3000
0%26deptid%3D%26archive%3D0%26sl_month%3D12; Also, while until recently no court has found Toyota responsible for unintended acceleration, after
the economic loss settlement was finalized, an Oklahoma jury reached a three
million dollar verdict for a Camry that allegedly accelerated killing one woman
and injuring another. Ken Bensinger & Jerry Hirsch, Toyota Hit with $3Million Verdict in Sudden Acceleration Death, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/24/autos/la-fi-hy-toyota-suddenacceleration-verdict-20131024.
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tations in effectively resolving automotive safety problems without the intervention of private litigants. Although recently criticized by scholars, the Toyota MDL has demonstrated that automotive defect litigation is still a necessary component of our legal
system. First, such an action can motivate the adoption of important safety improvements. Second, it can penalize automobile
manufacturers in amounts and for grounds beyond those available to the NHTSA. Third, such litigation can compensate consumers through relatively efficient settlements. Finally, it can
curb potentially misleading advertising practices.
A. Encouraging Implementation of Safety Improvements
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Theroff, supra note 91, at 619.
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The Toyota MDL demonstrated that automotive defect
litigation can still motivate important safety improvements. Even
though NHTSA does not currently require the installation of
BOS on vehicles, plaintiffs argued that a vehicle with an ETC is
unsafe without BOS and Toyota Motor Corp.’s ETC was particularly susceptible to electronic failures. While it could be argued
that it is unfair to hold a manufacturer at fault when the company abides by all of NHTSA’s safety standards, decisions made by
regulators are not always foolproof. Bureaucrats are rarely directly accountable to the public, can be susceptible to lobbying efforts, and often find themselves making a decisions that are a
compromise rather than what is best for consumers. 297 Safety
technology also develops rapidly and NHTSA rulemaking process is time consuming. Moreover, automobile manufacturers are
sophisticated companies tracking the technology incorporated by
their competitors and are therefore aware of what does and does
not constitute state-of-the-art technology.
Making manufacturers liable in our legal system for including safety technology, even when not specifically required by
NHTSA, motivates adoption of state-of-the-art technology as
soon as incorporating the technology is feasible. While it is not
necessarily possible to point specifically to the Toyota MDL and
explain that safety features resulted from litigation rather than
NHTSA’s efforts, it is quite clear that important safety features
have been adopted as a result of all parties efforts to combat unintended acceleration in Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles. As previously noted, NHTSA’s investigations and Toyota Motor Corp.’s
own voluntary actions as a manufacturer led to the removal of
heavy-duty, all-weather floor mats and the shortening of acceler-
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ator pedals on certain Toyota Motor Corp. Toyota and Lexus
model vehicles. However, as a result of or otherwise following the
Toyota MDL, several other critical safety improvements have
been made or are contemplated, including: (1) expanding the implementation of BOS; (2) reforming testing criteria for ETC systems; and (3) mandating the inclusion of readily readable event
data recorders on all vehicles.
1. Brake Override Software
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298
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Accelerator Control Systems, 77 Fed. Reg., 22638, 22640 (proposed April 16, 2012) (to
be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
299
USDOT Proposes Updated Safety Standards to Prioritize Braking
Control, Reduce Risk of High-Speed Unintended Acceleration for Nation’s
Cars
(April
12,
2012),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About%2BNHTSA/Press%2BReleases/2012/USDOT%
2BProposes%2BUpdated%2BSafety%2BStandard%2Bto%2BPrioritize%2BB
raking%2BControl,%2BReduce%2BRisk%2Bof%2BHighSpeed%2BUnintended%2BAcceleration%2Bfor%2BNation’s%2BCars
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The Toyota MDL economic loss settlement specifically requires the installation of BOS on subject vehicles. Moreover, following the Toyota MDL, it is likely that in the near future all
manufacturers will have to install BOS on their vehicles. On
April 12, 2012, NHTSA released a proposed rule requiring the installation of brake override on all new vehicles. The rule refers
specifically to the Saylor crash. Before explaining the necessary
BOS requirement, the rule explains that heat-related destruction
of some braking components revealed that Officer Saylor tried
unsuccessfully to stop his Lexus model vehicle but failed without
BOS. 298
According to the proposed rule, NHTSA research now indicates that requiring BOS will help decrease the risk of unintended acceleration and crashes involving a stuck or trapped accelerator pedal by allowing the driver to maintain control over a
vehicle through normal application of the brakes. NHTSA’s Administrator explained, “We learned as part of the comprehensive
NASA and NHTSA studies of high-speed acceleration that brake
override systems could help drivers avoid crashes.” 299 “While
NHTSA defect investigation program will continue to monitor
and consider consumer complaints of any potential vehicle safety
issues, this proposal is one way the agency is helping keep drivers
safe and continuing to work to reduce the risk of injury from
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sticky pedals or pedal entrapment issues.” 300
In addition to requiring BOS on all new vehicles,
NHTSA’s proposed rule also sets performance standards for
BOS. The rule explains the driving speeds and inputs that should
trigger the device. 301 The rule also proposes a performance test to
evaluate the ability of BOS to stop vehicles at certain speeds. 302
2. Electronic Throttle Control
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301
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305
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Id.
NHTSA, supra note 298 at 22644.
Id. at 22648-49.
Id. at 22642.
Id. at 22657-58.
Id. at 22643.
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Following the Toyota MDL, NHTSA is also considering
implementing standards for and testing criteria specific to ETC
systems despite NHTSA and NASA’s study not identifying any
electronic failures in Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles. NHTSA released a proposed rule revising the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard for accelerator control systems to more fully address the
failure modes for ETC systems. The proposed rule emphasizes
the importance of the ability of ETC systems to accurately relay
signals. The accurate relaying of signals is critical in preventing
incidents of unintended acceleration. According to the proposed
rule, it may also be possible for ETC systems to identify when an
accelerator pedal or other portion of the pedal assembly is malfunctioning. In such a circumstance, an ETC may be able to trigger a fail-safe action even without brake application through
BOS. “For example, an ETC could override the accelerator pedal
assembly if signals from the pedal position sensor exceed design
limits.” 303
To ensure quality performance of ETC systems, the rule
proposes revised testing for verifying the appropriate functioning
of ETC systems. 304 After ETC systems testing conducted by
NHTSA and NASA, NHTSA recognizes that ETC systems perform differently than mechanical linkages. Therefore, older testing criteria based on the performance of mechanical linkages is
outdated and so is any criteria analogizing to the performance of
mechanical linkages. According to NHTSA, “regulating ETC systems by drawing analogies to mechanical systems has undesirable
outcomes.” 305 For instance, “powertrain responses that can result
from failures in electronic systems are much more varied than
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with mechanical systems.” 306
3. Event Data Recorders
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Id.
Welcome to NHTSA Event Data Recorder Research Web Site,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/Research/Event+Data+Recorder+(EDR)/Welcome+to+t
he+NHTSA+Event+Data+Recorder+Research+Web+site (last visited Mar.
25, 2014).
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
49 C.F.R. § 563 (2014).
307
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Following the Toyota MDL, NHTSA is now also going to
require EDRs on all vehicles. A major difficulty in the Toyota
MDL was the ability to assess real world data related to unintended acceleration incidents. In the Toyota MDL, Toyota Motor
Corp. repeatedly asserted that an unintended acceleration event
was not possible under real world conditions, but it was difficult
or impossible to evaluate this assertion. While certain vehicles
that allegedly experienced unintended acceleration were
equipped with EDRs, they could not be read by third party devices. Only one device capable of reviewing EDRs existed in the
United States and was under the control of Toyota Motor Corp.
For over a decade, NHTSA has been under increased
pressure to require vehicles to install EDRs that are readable on
third party devices. On November 9, 1998, in 63 F.R. 60270, and
then on June 2, 1999, in 64 F.R. 29616, NHTSA denied petition
for rulemaking asking to require installation of EDRs in all new
automobiles. 307 In responding to these petitions, NHTSA said
EDRs could provide valuable information to understanding
crashes and could be used in a variety of ways to improve automobile safety. 308 NHTSA, however, said that it denied the petitions because the automobile industry was already voluntarily
moving in the direction recommended by the petitioners, and because NHTSA believed “this area presents some issues that are,
at least for the present time, best addressed in a non-regulatory
context.” 309
NHTSA later became more receptive to requiring EDRs.
On October 11, 2002, after receiving a third petition asking it to
require the installation of EDRs in new automobiles, in 67 F.R.
63493, NHTSA responded with a Request for Comments. On
June 14, 2004, in 69 F.R. 32932, NHTSA issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.310 NHTSA received over 100 submissions
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that the agency reviewed. 311
Only after the Toyota MDL, however, did NHTSA seriously pursue action on the matter. NHTSA has finally made
EDRs a requirement on all new vehicles sold and set standards
for these devices. 312 As of September 1, 2014, all automobiles sold
in the United States must be equipped with EDRs in accordance
with 49 C.F.R. § 563. 313
According to the regulation on point, requiring these devices will ensure the recording “in a readily usable manner, data
valuable for effective crash investigations and for analysis of safety equipment performance . . . data will help provide a better understanding of the circumstances in which crashes and injuries
occur and will lead to safer vehicle designs.” 314
Each EDR must be capable of recording certain specified
data, such as the speed of the vehicle and whether a brake was
being depressed. 315 There are requirements for the amount of time
that needs to be recorded which must be obtained for certain time
intervals in relation to an incident causing a crash. 316 There must
be two sources of data that can be used to prove or disprove an
instance of sudden unintended acceleration. 317 Data must be able
to survive a crash. 318 Moreover, each EDR must be readable by a
third party device within 90 days of the initial sale of a model. 319
B. Penalizing Toyota Motor Corporation

311
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On June 14, 2004, NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
69 F.R. 32932. Submissions received by NHTSA are available for review in
NHTSA, Event Data Recorder, 69 Fed. Reg. 32932 (proposed June 14, 2004)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 563); Healy supra note 64.
312
49 C.F.R. §§ 563 et seq. (2014).
313
49 C.F.R. § 563 (2014).
314
49 C.F.R. § 563.2 (2014).
315
49 C.F.R. § 563.7 (2014).
316
49 C.F.R. § 563.7 (2014).
317
49 C.F.R. § 563.9 (2014).
318
49 C.F.R. § 563.10 (2014).
319
49 C.F.R. § 563.12 (2014).
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The Toyota MDL demonstrated that automotive defect
litigation can severely penalize a manufacturer even without the
award of punitive damages afforded under tort law. Events surrounding the Toyota MDL showed how the fines imposed by
NHTSA are too narrow in scope. NHTSA fined Toyota Motor
Corp. for the manner in which it reported safety related data and
in which it conducted recalls. Toyota Motor Corp., however, was
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320
TMC Announces Global Sales Results for December 2012 and CY2012,
USA
NEWSROOM
(Jan.
28,
2013),
http://pressroom.toyota.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=3773.
321
Hiroko Tabuchi, Toyota Posts $2.2 Billion Annual Profit, THE
GAINESVILLE
SUN
(May
12,
2010,
8:38AM),
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20100512/znyt01/5123001.
322
Toyota Motor Corp. recently reached an unprecedented $1.2 billion
settlement with the United States Department of Justice, but the Department
of Justice’s willingness to take on similar future cases remains unclear. Danielle Douglas & Michael A. Fletcher, Toyota Reaches $1.2 Billion Settlement to
End Probe of Accelerator Problems, THE WASHINGTON POST (March 19,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/toyota-reaches-12billion-settlement-to-end-criminal-probe/2014/03/19/5738a3c4-af69-11e3-9627c65021d6d572_story.html.
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arguably responsible for more than simply these mishaps. Moreover, even if information was accurately reported and recalls were
conducted appropriately, consumers would have suffered significant economic loss.
In addition, events surrounding the Toyota MDL showed
how fines imposed by NHTSA are entirely too small in light of
the enormous resources of large automobile manufacturers.
NHTSA’s maximum penalty, which was recently increased to
$35 million, may be an effective deterrent to manufacturers of
certain smaller automobile devices. However, such a penalty even
if applied more than once will have only a minimal effect on a
major automobile manufacturer, such as a Toyota Motor Corp.
Toyota Motor Corp. sells nearly 10 million vehicles a year, 320 had
$200 billion in revenue in 2009 and an annual profit of approximately $2.2 billion for the fiscal year ending in March 31, 2010. 321
On the other hand, awards attainable in a major class action lawsuit such as the Toyota MDL are capable of reaching at least half
of the annual profit of a major automobile manufacture’s profit.
A settlement of $1.6 billion is more than two-thirds of Toyota
Motor Corp.’s annual profit in 2010. 322
It is also possible that a legal action brought on causes of
action for breach of warranty or consumer protection is less likely
to be overturned on appeal than an action brought on causes of
action for negligence or strict liability. Actions brought on the latter causes of action have in some circumstances resulted in punitive damages where manufacturers deliberately decided to forgo
specific safety features to save costs. Courts, however, have reduced these decisions on appeal. In the Toyota MDL, similar logical arguments were at least inferred, in so much that Toyota Motor Corp. deliberately decided not to incorporate BOS, which it
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knew could save lives. Nonetheless, the settlement was viewed as
appropriate by the court. Even if decided by a jury, calculations
aggregating economic loss may be more defensible than punitive
damages. Here calculations are grounded in sales figures and
trade publications rather than punitive damages that could be
viewed more of as an emotional reaction.
In addition to settlement payments and even beyond money expended on attorney’s fees, fines and recalls, the Toyota
MDL has also forced Toyota Motor Corp. to suffer significant
reputational harms. While it is difficult to attribute how much the
publicity surrounding the Toyota MDL has contributed to declining sale as opposed to publicity surrounding Congressional hearings and NHTSA investigations, the manufacturer’s sales were
flat in 2010 while nearly every other major manufacturer reported gains. 323
C. Efficiently Compensating Plaintiffs
The Toyota MDL demonstrated that automotive defect
litigation, in particular a large class action lawsuit, can efficiently
compensate plaintiffs. Recently some American courts have
withdrawn from class actions because of their reluctance to decide important issues collectively. 324 There have also been criticisms that class action attorney’s fees are too high. 325 However,
while the Toyota MDL case resulted in the largest automotive defect settlement in United States history, fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys were praised as reasonable by the judge overseeing the case,
representing only a fraction of the award.
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This ended a thirty year unbroken run of market-share increase in the
United States. Mike Ramsey, Toyota in $1.1 Billion Gas-Pedal Settlement,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL,
(Dec.
27,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732466910457820344099
0704994; Toyota Motor Corp. also fell behind General Motors Co. in sales to
become only the world’s second largest manufacturer, before later rebounding.
Chester Dawson, Toyota Again World’s Largest Auto Maker, WALL STREET
JOURNAL
(Jan.
28,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732337520457826918106
0493750.
324
Elizabeth Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1475, 1479 (2005).
325
Id. at 1477 (summarizing arguments used against class actions lawsuits
which she later rebuffs); Legal scholars recently argued that product liability
lawsuits did not effectively compensate victims of automobile accidents, but its
analysis was based on situations where insurance was an important factor in
providing compensation. Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 2 at 1469.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 94 Side A

323

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 94 Side B

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Ezroj Article3.docx (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

522

5/21/2014 2:36 PM

Vol. 26:3

326

C M
Y K

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Cabraser, supra note 324 at 1477.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV.
1257, 1258 (1995).
328
Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS. L. J. 1, 3 (1992).
329
Id.
330
Hazard, supra note 327 at 1258.
327
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This efficiency was due in part to the ability of plaintiffs’
counsel to pull resources reducing costs through economies of
scale. While the Toyota MDL involved significant discovery responsibilities and costs, these responsibilities and costs were
shared among law firms. In identifying and analyzing important
information, attorneys at these law firms were also presumably
able to rely on one another’s expertise and share important findings. In developing case strategy, plaintiffs’ counsel was presumably able to do the same.
It is unclear what costs would be if more cases were litigated independently rather than as a class. Empirical evidence,
however, has found that court-awarded fees in class actions are
significantly lower as a percentage of dollars recovered than private contingent fee arrangements, especially in more risky cases
where a higher percentage fee is generally charged. 326 Because of
the novel nature of various aspects of the lawsuit and demands
presented by discovery, it is reasonable to assume that litigating
more cases separately would have significantly decreased the efficiency of any resolution.
Efficiency was also due in part to plaintiffs’ counsel’s ability to reach an early settlement. At a minimum, a settlement reduces this high transaction cost involved in compensating victims. 327 For this and other reasons, it is a fundamental principle of
law that settlements and compromise are favored. 328 American
courts invoke this policy to enforce past settlements, approve tentative settlements and even pressure parties uninterested in settling to at least discuss the possibility. 329 Litigation is expensive
and in some cases two-thirds or three-quarters of every dollar
spent can go to litigation rather than compensating victims. 330
While the Toyota MDL involved significant discovery expenses,
the dispute was decided without a trial and without significant
monies spent on some of the more costly pretrial matters such as
obtaining and prepping expert witnesses.
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s ability to reach an early settlement
agreement with Toyota Motor Corp. is arguably attributable to
the manner in which plaintiffs’ counsel argued the Economic
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Loss Complaint. Toyota Motor Corp., which once pledged to
fight unintended acceleration allegations indefinitely, may have
been more willing to settle claims based on a breach of warranty
or consumer protection causes of action rather than a claim based
on negligence or strict liability causes of action. While a settlement agreement often states that a settling manufacturer is not at
fault for certain damages, public opinion still will attribute some
degree of fault to a settling party. Along these lines, it is easier for
a manufacturer to justify to its consumers that it is reaching a settlement where the manufacturer is essentially just admitting that
the value of their vehicles have decreased due to market forces,
than a claim brought under a negligence or strict liability causes
of action where they are essentially de facto admitting that their
vehicles are defective. Moreover, here the settlement demonstrated that a plaintiff can succeed in gaining an extremely large
award without showing the necessary intent typically associated
with punitive damages or a serious physical injury to a plaintiff.
The settlement is likely to influence actions of other vehicle and product manufacturers. Currently, Audi is being sued for
economic loss of its vehicles due to allegations of unintended acceleration. 331 Ford and Firestone are also being sued for economic
loss of its tires for defect allegations. Approximately 3.5 million of
these lawsuits were given class-action status. 332 If Toyota Motor
Corp. is able to successfully market its Toyota MDL settlement,
then Audi, Ford and Firestone may reach similar settlement
agreements with plaintiffs pursuing actions against them.
D. Curbing Misleading Advertisements

331

C M
Y K

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Andreas Cremer & Tom Lavell, Audi 1980s Scare May Mean Lost
Generation
for
Toyota,
BUSINESS
WEEK,
Feb.
4,
2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aFAbB4LZ3h6
A.
332
David Kiley, Judge Expands Lawsuit vs. Ford, Firestone, USA TODAY,
Nov. 29, 2001, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/autos/2001/11/28/tiresuits-class.htm.

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 95 Side A

The Toyota MDL demonstrated that automotive defect
litigation can curb misleading advertisements. With a shifting focus to breach of warranty or consumer protection causes of action, increased attention will be placed on manufacturer statements. A plaintiff in a breach of warranty claim will attempt to
demonstrate that a manufacturer has advertised specific qualities
of his or her product that were in fact not present. A plaintiff pursuing various consumer protections claims will attempt to make a
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Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part supra note 266 at 29.; In re
Toyota Motor Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Van
Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1078 (E.D. Cal.
2010).
334
Dexter Ford, What’s So Special About Toyota’s Star Safety System,
N.Y.
TIMES
(JUNE
29,
2010,
7:30
AM),
http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/whats-so-special-about-toyotasstar-safety-system/?_r=0; Plaintiffs also attacked Toyota Motor Corp. for this
advertising campaign as well. Nonetheless, advertising specific safety features
that are generally accepted in the automobile industry still is arguably a more
prudent approach than that taken in previous Toyota Motor Corp. marketing
campaigns. Amended Economic Loss Master Consolidated Complaint 92-93
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010).
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similar showing. In particular of those claims made by plaintiffs
in the Toyota Economic Loss Complaint, plaintiffs will desire to
make such a showing for the following causes of action: Violations of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, and Violation of the California
False Advertising Law. 333
While Toyota Motor Corp.’s marketing motivations are
not entirely public, it can be argued that Toyota Motor Corp.’s
has refocused its advertisement efforts with breach of warranty
and consumer protection causes of action in mind. Toyota’s Star
Safety System was popularly advertised after allegations of unintended acceleration in 2010. Rather than simply advertising
Toyota Motor Corp.’s vehicles as safe or promoting a single safety feature that has been criticized by certain consumer advocates,
the Star Safety System promotes five safety features that are generally accepted as reliable within the automobile industry. The
five safety features include: (1) vehicle stability control; (2) traction control; (3) antilock brakes; (4) electronic brake-force distribution; and (5) brake assist. 334
As with Toyota Motor Corp., prior to allegations of unintended acceleration, other manufacturers may find it easier to
market their vehicles as simply safe. Or, they may try to obtain an
advantage over their competitors by arguing that they are first to
incorporate a novel technological feature. If lawsuits arguing
breach of warranty and consumer protection causes of action,
however, continue to gain momentum, other manufacturers may
take note of Toyota Motor Corp.’s refocused advertisement efforts and focus their advertisements on concrete safety features
that are generally accepted within the automobile industry.
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CONCLUSION
Automotive defect litigation has evolved in the face of less
friendly tort law environment. Rather than relying on traditional
tort law causes of action for negligence or strict liability, plaintiffs
are finding that they must rely on causes of action typically associated with contract law or a violation of various consumer protection laws. Nonetheless, the Toyota MDL demonstrated that
such an approach can still be effective in addressing social ills.
There may in fact even be distinct advantages to such an approach. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, automotive defect
litigation is likely to remain a necessary component of our legal
system and may even increase in importance.
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